Diotima in Symposium by Plato

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Phronesis 54 (2009) 297-325 brill.nl/phro Diotima’s Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato’s Symposium Ralph Wedgwood Merton College, Oxford OX1 4JD, UK ralph.wedgwood@merton.ox.ac.uk Abstract This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato’s Symposium (199d212a). According to this interpretation, the term “καλόν”, as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call “intrinsic value”; and “love” (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation, which for Plato consists in the desire to “possess” intrinsically valuable things – that is, according to Plato, to be happy – for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that “possessing” intrinsically valuable things, at least for mortals like us, consists in actively creating instantiations of the intrinsic values, both in oneself and in the external world, and in knowing and loving these intrinsic values and their instantiations. Finally, it is argued that this interpretation reveals that Plato’s “eudaemonism” is a different and more defensible doctrine than many commentators believe. Keywords Plato, Symposium, intrinsic value, rational motivation, eudaemonism 0. Introduction The heart of Plato’s Symposium (199d-212a) consists of a series of claims and arguments that are represented as being put forward by Socrates, as his contribution to a discussion of the nature of love (ἔρως). For most of this part of the dialogue (from 201d onwards), Socrates is represented as attributing these claims and arguments to a mysterious priestess whom he calls Diotima. As I shall argue, these pages in fact contain a brilliant and © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/003188609X12486562883093 298 R. Wedgwood / Phronesis 54 (2009) 297-325 perceptive analysis of the nature of rational motivation – an analysis that is

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