Congressional Voting Behavior

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A long-standing question in political science is whether exchange occurs in legislatures, as it is expected in any economy where the intensity of demand varies. Currently, vote trading's quantitative importance and optimality are unknown. However, much might be learned from such analysis, given the apparent puzzle that for most roll-calls votes on parts of bills only a minority of districts stand to gain. Yet such proposals get passed. Related to the issue of vote trading is the question of what factors determine congressional voting behavior. Major elements in a legislator's voting decision are constituency interests, ideology, party, and (perhaps) vote trading. One segment of the literature on congressional voting has focused on the role…show more content…
For example, legislators from farm districts are predicted to vote for farm subsidies. It is also in the constituency's interest that their representative trades votes on some proposals that the constituency is mildly opposed to, in exchange for votes on proposals the constituency is intensely in favor of. For example, voters from a textile district may prefer that their representative casts a vote in favor of steel interests if this ensures that sufficient votes are cast for a tariff on textiles.(3). Focus on the welfare implications of logrolling has raised a number of analytical problems. These include, amongst others, the prevalence of logrolling as a function of the nature of decision rules, electoral systems, and party systems; the extent to which logrolling takes account of preference 'intensities' and whether logrolling avoids or generates the 'cyclical majority'…show more content…
First, we have the case of ordinary economic exchange. Suppose A grows nothing but apples and B nothing but oranges, so A controls the allocation of apples between them and B the allocation of oranges. Since each actor prefers more fruit to less, neither would unilaterally transfer fruit to the other. But if A and B each prefers a mixed diet, they can both benefit by trading fruit. Three points can be noted here. First, the fact of mutually beneficial trade depends on 'finer' aspects of the actors' preferences (their 'marginal rates of substitution') that are otherwise irrelevant. Second, since the trade is in private goods, no one else is affected and mutually advantageous trade unambiguously increases social welfare. Third, if (say) apples come in season before oranges, B would have to be able to make a credible promise (e.g., by means of an enforceable contract) to A for the gains from trade to be
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