Freewill and Determinism

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If all my actions, my beliefs and my desires are determined by preceding conditions, how can I ever be free? This is the conflict presented by traditional theories of determinism and freewill. But analysis of such a concept of freewill shows it be incoherent. In this case, we must either reject the thesis that we have freewill, or reformulate our concept of freewill so that it is coherent. I will argue that such a reformulation is not only compatible with determinism but also necessary, if we are to maintain that we have any kind of freewill. If we wish to test the compatibility of determinism with the traditional account of freewill, we must first understand what each of these theories entails. Determinism is the theory that each event in the world is entirely due to various preceding conditions or causes. And, as each of these causes is, in itself, the effect of various still-earlier causes (which are themselves the effects of even earlier causes), then, so long as the very first cause or set of causes is in place, what follows is entirely determined. We might compare it to a wall built of dominos: when I knock the first domino it is determined that the last domino, no matter how many dominoes away it is, will fall. The falling of each domino along the way is both an effect of the fallen dominoes behind it, and a cause of the fall of the dominoes which still stand in front of it. It is both a determined and a determining part of the causal chain. Because it’s movements are caused by the preceding conditions (the preceding falling dominoes), there is only one possible way the domino can behave; it is not possible a domino might fail to knock the next domino down (assuming we have properly built the wall and there are no external interventions) for, though the domino is in itself a cause, that it is such was caused by events outside of itself. The domino
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