In 1947, Stalin established Conform. This was a plan to organize activities of Communist parties in Europe to control capitalist ideas and spread communism hence, strengthen the Soviet’s power. Then two years later, another one of Stalin’s foreign policy, Comecon was set up to coordinate the economy of Eastern Europe. Although these methods were seen by the West, Stalin’s action to secure the Soviet Union’s power, these actions were self-defensive policies against US’s policies, the Truman Doctrine and the
Where the two governments differ is in the respect of tolerance towards cooperation with others. In Alexander III's Tsarist autocracy, minsters were personally chosen by the Tsar, and could only advise him-he still had to make the decisions himself. In addition, all other political parties in Tsarist times were banned, through methods such as arresting members of opposing political parties and censoring the press. In Lenin's Communist dictatorship, Lenin instead chose to work with members in committees such as the Sovnarkom and the Politburo in order
Ronald E. Powaski, Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991, goes in depth with origins of the Cold war and the relations between American-Soviet rivalry. Powaski challenges the reader to think of the war in new ways and provides an innovative perspective on the conflicts of the two countries. He shows that both America and Soviet were expansionist nations with developments that influenced history. He also emphasis on the new development that have added on to the countries rivalry relationship and highlights what ties them together in conflict. Powaski argues that “That the Cold War was inevitable.
[They] offer the arms race as their main recipe for their preservation of peace!” Khrushchev made a speech in 1956 stating his beliefs that the US was making alliances not for fear of communism, but for a dominant position in the capitalist world. He also believes the arms race could easily lead to another war. As illustrated in Document 7, there was a steady buildup of ICBMS and long range bombers between 1966 and 1974. Document 7 states, “This nuclear buildup led to a “balance of terror” which some saw as a deterrent to war.” The fear that either country could the other to oblivion led to a balance of terror. This arms race led to a dangerous competition which could have easily led to a nuclear
This would further enhance the policy of containment and would help to prevent the spread of communism into the west. The fact that Stalin was expanding communism into Eastern Europe forced the USA to increase its military spending in order to protect not only itself, but the rest of its western allies from communist threats. By expanding their military across Western Europe, the USA was gaining more and more power on a global scale. Again, the USSR would see this increase in military spending as an attack on communism and so in order to protect itself from yet another invasion, bearing in mind the fact that it had already been invaded twice in the last two years, they put forward ‘defensive’ measures towards the USA, for example the Berlin Blockade, which lead to the start of the Cold War. Moreover, by involving themselves in the Korean War, the USA was following through with its policy of containment by protecting South Korea from communist forces in the North.
NSC-68 provided the doctrinal justification for US intervention in Korea. Some would argue that the US desire to contain Communism came from the idea that Stalin was behind the invasion of South Korea in the first place. During a secret visit to Moscow in April 1950, Kim II Sung was given permission to launch a war of reunification in Korea from Stalin. Stalin also agreed to provide additional Soviet military assistance. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the US desire to contain Communism contributed to their involvement in the Korean War due to NSC-68 providing a more aggressive tack and because some Americans were led to believe that Stalin was behind the invasion of South Korea.
Containment may have of failed and been made evident with the Cuban missile crisis however it led to a growing awareness of the need to create some control over the nuclear arms race by placing restrictions on nuclear tests. The assessment is valid in saying that the missile crisis was complete evidence containment failed as more countries in Eastern Europe were becoming communist. Containment was a failure before the crisis because in 1948 Czechoslovakia was forced to accept communism. Even though in 1947 they were not fully communist there were still some communist-dominated coalition governments. Until the Czech coup, the emphasis in Washington had been on economic containment of Communism, primarily through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and a heavy reliance on atomic power as a shield to support it.
The Truman Doctrine was an endorsed acknowledgment to the public and Russia that the U.S. would support countries to be freed, and thwart communism. The Truman Doctrine supported Greece in the anti-revolutionary movements, and protected Turkey from transpiring communism. The predominant intention of the Truman Doctrine was to promulgate as it benefited to reach American confirmation of a Cold War with Russia. Truman came up with the Marshall plan in 1947, providing financial aid to Western European countries to expedite economic recovery because Truman was going to need help in order to go to war with
Another issue was that Russia wanted the countries affected by the Nazi invasion to form a communist block as a cohesive strength against a possible German takeover in the future. The U.S. felt that this was an opportune time for democracy to finally take hold in many
In order to fight the Cold War, President Harry S Truman oversaw a revolution in American foreign policy. Characterized by policies and institutions such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Berlin airlift, the strategy of containment redefined liberal internationalism and involved the United States in the world as never before. Despite such programs, however, the Communists made gains in atomic weapons, propaganda, Europe, and China in the late 1940s. In 1950, NSC 68 — primarily and theoretically — and Korea secondarily and practically — confirmed for Truman what he already believed: In the end, the Cold War would be won or lost on moral grounds. But he could not turn to the United Nations for moral authority, since