Nagel's Bat Argument

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Jessica Moore December 4th, 2013 Metaphysics Paper 2 Do the Phenomenological Features of Experience Make Physicalism False? A Defense of Nagel A major area of contention within the realms of the philosophic world is how to accurately depict the relationship between mind and body. Physicalism attempts to answer this question through the view that the universe, including all that seems mental, is entirely physical. However, according to dualist philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson, a primary obstacle for the physicalist is the apparent contrast between the intrinsic natures of our experiences and of the brains states with which they are allegedly identical. While both Nagel and Jackson propose that the nature of the mental makes it such that it cannot be explained solely through the physicalist perspective, they reach very different conclusions. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate both Nagel’s and Jackson’s famous arguments, explicating their contrasting conclusions about physicalism. Finally my ultimate objective is to highlight the strengths in Nagel’s reasoning, as it is my opinion that he offers more convincing, well thought-out implications in regard to how we understand mental phenomena. I. Nagel’s Argument for Physicalism Examining Nagel’s infamous article “What Is It Like to Be A Bat”, it is evident that he finds reductionist theories of the mental insufficient in accounting for the “widespread phenomenon” that is consciousness (Nagel, 519). According to Nagel, “fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is to be that organism—something it is like for the organism” (Nagel, 519). This "what it is like" he calls this the "subjective character of experience”, which does not entail similarities in resemblance, but rather how the experience actually is for the subject
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