EXCEPTIONS: overcome rule by finding a REAL promise - frame illusory promise as unilateral contract => enforceable ex. Gurfein (99): had window to cancel, but didn’t => enforceable ➢ COULD HAVE bound other party if exercise option - Implied promises ➢ UCC §2-306 (2): a contract to engage in exclusive dealing gives rise to an implied promise to use best efforts Ex. Wood v. Lucy (104): mkt designs for profits ➢ ct implied promise: to make reasonable efforts b/c w/o implied promise, the contract would be meaningless b/c structural agreement = incentive to use best effort is built in Ex. Grouse (110): promised at-will job, not allowed to start work ➢ implied promise in at-will jobs = “good faith opportunity to perform satisfactorily’ - Structural agreements Ex. Lacledes(106): supply propane for long period ➢ although not bound to purchase, practical binding exists ➢ pipes connected to Amoco supply source ➢ hostage theory of contracts: voluntarily
What facts may weigh in favor of or against Chou in terms of the parties’ objective intent to contract? This fact weighs in favor of Chou, because he in fact believed that BTT was in favor of the distribution contract. BTT also provided misleading information by making a payment of 25,000 for the exclusive negotiation rights for the board game STRAT. However, both parties only made an oral agreement, and not a written contract to show this fact. Since the contact was not drafted within the 90-day timeframe, new management could not make obligation to distribute the product, and had the right to decline Chou of his prior agreement through oral agreement.
This may pose a limitation regarding John’s claim whereby the gallery could potentially argue that John does not have a proprietary interest as the painting has not effectively been registered, which may exemplify the nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what they lack) principle. The effect in equity of an unregistered voluntary transfer was in issue before the High Court in the leading case of Corin v Patton. In this case the wife had attempted to create a trust in favour of her by executing a transfer of her interest in the joint tenancy to a trustee. The wife died prior to registration without taking any action to obtain the certificate of title which would have enabled the transfer to be registered. The trial judge, McLelland J, held that the joint tenancy had not been severed.
The plaintiff appealed. Issue The court sought to determine whether the past consideration done gratuitously would make the promise of future agreement enforceable. Holding/Decision The court upheld the lower courts findings, that the promise made by Tallas was not supported by any consideration and that the agreement showed that Tallas planned on making the change sometime in the future. They also found that the work done by the
Also, the promissor has to expect that, upon the promise, it will induce action by the promisee. The promissor cannot say it wasn't part of the contract. Why does this doctrine exist? The doctrine exists to protect a person who was promised something and there is no essential elements of a contract that exists. Did the court reach the proper decision in the case you discussed?
does not constitute a court order sufficient to override the presumption of paternity. Likewise, we find that failure on the part of Darlene Romer to respond to a request for admission under Civil Rule 36 admitting that Richard Romer is not the biological father of R.M., does not constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut paternity, in the opposite, the superior court finding that “the plaintiff is not the father of R.M. and owes no support” is clearly erroneous because it makes no mention of the standard of proof it used as opposed to that set out in AS 25.20.050 Legitimation by subsequent marriage, acknowledgment in writing, or
To show this, the plaintiff claimed that because the defendant knew the plaintiff was Caruso’s next of kin; a duty to the plaintiff was therefore formed. The defendant filed a motion to strike the negligence claim on the grounds that it failed to state a cognizable legal duty and failed to allege facts to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (More Law) They also argued that the alleged facts did not show negligence on their part. They instead felt the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence, in its view, were fatally flawed because they failed to establish the existence of any legal relationship that would have imposed on the defendant a duty of care to the plaintiff. (More Law) In Del Core’s view, she felt the defendant’s untimely manner in informing her of her brother’s death would foreseeably hinder her from making proper arrangements for her brother’s burial.
- The court must decide if the advertisement constituted an offer, and if the mistake is genuine and can be grounds to avoid the contract due to a unilateral mistake of fact. What is the court’s reasoning? (Might include reliance on precedent, statutory interpretation and legislative history & societal considerations) - The court first looked at whether an advertisement can be considered an offer. The court differentiates between advertisements that are in fact invitations for individuals to negotiate an offer, and advertisements that ask for a specific action without further communication and leave nothing for negotiation. The first category of advertisements is not considered offers, while the latter is not.
For over a year Lester abused Lillian. When Lillian told Lester she wanted out of the relationship, Lester told her to pack up and leave. ISSUES (1) Will a court grant a Temporary Restraining Order against Lester for the protection of our client, prior to divorce and child custody hearings? (2) Is the relationship between Lillian and Lester considered a marriage in which a divorce, division of property, and child support can be granted? (3) Will the court grant Lillian child support for her four children, even though she is not certain that Lester is the children’s father?
In addition, the investors and creditors of Phar-Mor did not have a written agreement with the auditor, Coopers & Lybrand’s, defining Coopers & Lybrand’s duty. Thus, those investors and creditors are third parties but not primary beneficiaries. Consequently, Coopers & Lybrand was held not liability for the investors and creditors. On the other hand, Plaintiffs alleged that Coopers & Lybrand had recklessly audited Phar-Mor financial statements and if Coopers & Lybrand’s