The first fact that may be in favor of Chou is that BTT showed interest and paid him $25,000 in exchange of negotiation rights. The oral contract reached by both parties at the meeting can also be in Chou’s favor. Last, the confirmation e-mail sent to Chou by BTT can be seen as the parties’ objective intent to contract. The e-mail sent to Chou included key terms of the distribution agreement. Although there are many facts in favor of Chou there was never a signed contract which legally means that there was never a contract in existence because there was no written signed documentation.
• Was there discussion on justification of a contract? • Was there an agreement on the details of the relationship that contained sufficient certainty on the establishment of a contract? Result: • The claim made by the plaintiff had failed since the judges decided that the parties did not appear to have any legal relations intended. • Appeal by the plaintiff was not allowed but a cross-appeal was. Reasons: • Precedent from the case Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 shows that a promissory estoppel cannot create a cause of action.
That is, the judge holds that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient grounds, even what is claim is true, to be able to win a verdict. After a jury returns a verdict, the losing party may make a motion for judgment as a matter of law or a motion for judgment now withstanding the verdict. The judge is asked to hold that there were not legally sufficient grounds to support the jury’s verdict and to either overturn the entire verdict or a portion of it. Courts preferred post– verdict motions to pre—verdict motions because, if an appeals court reverses a post verdict motion, there is no need to redo the entire trial. Q: The jury believes the expert testimony presented for plaintiffs.
After three days of negotiation, Porter presented a settlement offer of $250,000 to Schultz over the telephone and subsequently mailed a check of that amount to Schultz based off of an agreement between the two. This agreement was ambiguous as Porter stated in his deposition that Schultz did not accept the offer over the telephone but agreed that having the check in his hands would help him make a decision. Schultz’s reception of the settlement check of $250,000 was verified by Porter via telephone on 4/28/10. Schultz retained the settlement check without cashing it over the next eight months. During this time period Porter attempted to make contact with Schultz in order to obtain a definitive acceptance; he called eleven times, leaving eleven voicemail messages and sent seven written letters; the letters stated that the FLCI has assumed acceptance and that the check should be returned immediately if Schultz
Case Brief November 17, 2013 LSTD506 Property Law Professor Moneymaker Case: Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218 (1982) Reference: Barlow Burke (2010). Foundations of Property Law (3rd Edition) Pg. 210. Retrieved from the American Public University Online Resource Summary: A married couple (the plaintiffs) realized their hilltop home was sliding down a hill and believed the sliding was originated from the hydrostatic pressure of the adjacent landowner’s (defendant) deteriorated retaining wall (Barlow Burke, 2010, Pg.125). The defendant however, believes he isn’t at fault because the plaintiff(s) are responsible for their own property.
Jordan retired in 1993 but came back to the league in 1995, no contract was made between Knafel and Jordan after his first retirement. It was not until his second announcement that came in 1998 that Knafel contacted him. She reminded him about their agreement to pay her the 5 million dollars. After Jordan retired he failed to pay Knafel alleging that she was trying to extort 5 million dollars from him. Procedure Jordan filed for a declaratory judgement alleging that Knafel was attemting to extort 5 million dollars from him and even if there was an agreement made it was undenforcable because of fraud and mutual mistake.
But these are limited in use to certain circumstances. The binding part of the judgement is called the ratio decidendi and later courts are bound to follow legal principles on which the decision was based if their case contains similar facts, as for example, in Donoghue V Stevenson (1932) a precedent was set that a customer could sue a manufacturer in negligence. Obita Dicta (other things said not directly related to the decision or dissenting judgements), are persuasive rather than binding precendents, as seen
Additional requirement for admissibility of multiple hearsay A hearsay statement is not admissible to prove the fact that an earlier hearsay statement was made unless: either of the statements is admissible or all the parties to the proceedings agree; or the court is satisfied that the value of the evidence in question, taking into account how reliable the statements appear to be, is so high that the interests of justice require the later statement to be admissible for that purpose. ‘Hearsay statement’ means a statement, not made in oral evidence, that is relied on as evidence of a matter stated in it. Memory refreshing A witness giving oral evidence in court may use a document to refresh his or her memory, provided that the document was made (or verified) by him at an earlier time, and provided: he states that the document records his recollections of the matter at that earlier time and his recollection of the matter is likely to have been significantly better at the time the document was made, than at the time of his oral evidence. Running head: UNIT 5 ASSIGNMENT 10
→Court said examiner does not act as counsel, but as fact-finder. →Court says P has due process rights; didn’t USE subpoena power to cross examine witness. **Lesson is due process is really only about opportunity to participate. →Differed from Wong case because it was NOT an adversarial proceeding; fact finding body not dealing with adversarial claims, so examiner roles were not in conflict. →**take home: If you want to make a due process claim, need to make the argument that it is an adversarial proceeding wherein prosecutorial and judicial roles are being conflated.
as a whole” test laid down by Lindley MR in Allen as inappropriate in the context of competing rights and interests of shareholders.18 The court drew a distinction between two different types of constitutional alterations. For alterations not involving “expropriation of shares or of valuable proprietary rights attaching to shares” it is sufficient if the special resolution is passed regularly, is not ultra vires, not beyond any purpose contemplated by the constitution nor oppressive.19 With respect to alterations that do involve expropriation of shares, or valuable proprietary rights attached to shares, different considerations apply. The majority laid down a twopronged test, holding that amendments to the constitution permitting expropriation are only permissible if: • the power is exercisable for a proper purpose; and • its exercise will not operate oppressively in relation to minority shareholders.20 Ibid at 386. Contra this reasoning see Brett W King, “Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection” (1996) 21 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 895 at 907. 13 Vanessa Mitchell, “Gambotto and the Rights of Minority Shareholders” (1994) 6 Bond Law Review 92 at 102.