Ac 885 Week 1 Experimental Economics Sample

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EC 885 Experimental Economics I Fall 2009 Monday 4:30 – 7:10 pm, Thompson Hall 110 (Fairfax) (revised, September 3, 2009) Professor Ragan Petrie 400-KK Truland Building (Arlington) 703-993-4842 rpetrie1@gmu.edu OH: M, 2:30-4:30pm, room 344 Enterprise Hall, or by appointment Course Objectives: We will survey some of the recent literature in Experimental Economics. Research in this area is enormous, and we will not be able to cover everything. The goal of this course is to give you a flavor of seminal research papers, as well as some of the currently active areas of research. The experimental research project that you develop in this class could become a chapter of your dissertation. The background for the course is graduate-level microeconomic…show more content…
They are expected to present one of the papers on the reading list later in the semester, leading the discussion on the paper and topic. Project: There will be no exams for the course, but students will be required to submit a course project. Students must complete two projects. PROJECT 1: Write a paper that surveys the literature in one area of interest of any topic concerning experimental economics and suggest tests of unanswered questions. Topics may be different from those covered in the course, but should be approved by Professor Petrie. Maximum length should be 10 pages. PROJECT 2: Design an experiment. The design should include a statement of the research question, a prediction based on economic theory, the task the subjects will complete, a sketch of the protocol (instructions for subjects, directions for experimenters), number of subjects per condition, and a description of how the data will be analyzed to test the prediction. Students are encouraged to work in pairs to design their studies. At the end of the semester, each team of designers must present their experimental ideas to the class Grading: 20% participation, 40% Project 1, 40% Project 2. Blackboard:…show more content…
Simmons and A.J.C. van de Kragt, 1986, “Organizing Groups for Collective Action,” American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1171-85. Bagnoli, Mark and Michael McKee, 1991, “Voluntary Contributions Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods,” Economic Inquiry, 29(2), 351-366. Bagnoli, Mark, Shaul Ben-David and Michael McKee, 1994, “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Multiple Unit Case,” Journal of Public Economics, 47(1), 85-106. Rondeau, Daniel, William D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe, 1999, “Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism,” Journal of Public Economics, 72(3), 455-470. Rondeau, Daniel, Gregory L. Poe and William D. Schulze, 2005, “VCM or PPM? A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms,” Journal of Public Economics, 89(8), 15811592. c. Mechanism Design Sefton, Martin and Abdullah Yavas, 1996, “Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 16(2), 280-302. Chen, Yan and Charles Plott, 1996, “The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design,” Journal of Public Economics, 59(3), 335-364. Chen, Yan and Fang-Fang Tang, 1998, “Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(3), 633-662. d. Fund-raising and Organic
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