To successfully invoke this defense, the purchaser or occupier had to establish that it had no reason to know that the property was contaminated. Since the problem with brownfields is the existence or suspicion of contamination, the defense was largely unavailable to prospective developers or tenants of brownfield sites. To eliminate this obstacle to redevelopment of brownfields, the Brownfield Amendments created the BFPP defense for landowners or tenants who knowingly acquire or lease contaminated property after January 11, 2002. Only those parties that qualify for the BFPP defense are potentially subject to the windfall lien. To qualify for the BFPP, the owner or tenant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it has satisfied the following eight conditions: • All disposal of hazardous substances occurred before the purchaser acquired the facility.
Unlike under unjust enrichment, however, a plaintiff can recover under quantum meruit even if he confers no benefit on the defendant. See, e.g., Barnes v. Lozoff, 20 Wis.2d 644, 123 N.W.2d 543 (Wis.1963) (allowing recovery for architect who created blueprints that were valueless to the defendant because defendant did not own some of the land at issue in the blueprints). Under quantum meruit, damages are “measured by the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services,” and calculated at “the customary rate of pay for such work in the community at the time the work was performed.” To take advantage of the more liberal recovery rule of quantum meruit, a plaintiff must prove two elements, both relating to the parties' course of conduct. As explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to recover under quantum meruit, the plaintiff must prove that “the defendant requested the [plaintiff's] services” and “the plaintiff expected reasonable compensation” for the
Case Brief: Dermentas v Estate of Tallas Denise Manley Saint Leo University Legal Enviroment of Business MBA-535 Professor John Bermingham May 26, 2013 Case Brief: Dermentas v Estate of Tallas Name DeMentas, v. Estate of Tallas, By and Through First Second Bank 764 P.2d 628, Utah App., No. 860351-ca November 7th 1988 Procedural History Plaintiff Peter Dementas appeals from a judgment dismissing his claim against the Estate of Jack Tallas. Facts Peter Dementas was a personal friend of Jack Tallas. On December 18, 1982, Jack Tallas met with Peter Dementas and dictated a memorandum to him, in Greek, stating that he owed Dementas $50,000 for his help over the years for such things as picking up his mail, driving him to the grocery store, and assisting with the management of Jack Tallas's rental properties. Jack Tallas also indicated in the memorandum that he would change his will to make Peter Dementas an “heir for the sum of $50,000.” Jack Tallas had the document retyped in English and notarized the English version with his own notary seal and gave a copy to Peter Dementas.
In addition, the investors and creditors of Phar-Mor did not have a written agreement with the auditor, Coopers & Lybrand’s, defining Coopers & Lybrand’s duty. Thus, those investors and creditors are third parties but not primary beneficiaries. Consequently, Coopers & Lybrand was held not liability for the investors and creditors. On the other hand, Plaintiffs alleged that Coopers & Lybrand had recklessly audited Phar-Mor financial statements and if Coopers & Lybrand’s
Applied Business Law Individual Work Week 10 Linda Baker Everest University Online June 22, 2012 Instructor Antonia Asterino Insurable Interest The insurable interest must exist when the policy was purchased and at the time of the loss. (1) If you would sustain a loss financially from the property’s destruction, then you have insurable interest. (2) Interstate Distribution Corporation bought Eagle Sales Company and put insurance on the property. Interstate had possession of the property when the policy was taken out. Eagle Sales Company did not have any insurable interest in the property.
Apparently, the decedent didn’t anticipate potential problems between her husband and her adult children – but maybe she should have. When Sally Sauer drafted her will she could have made her intent clear that the conveyance of the
Sunoco is probably going to be held strictly liable for the clean-up costs, even though it appears that the leak occurred prior to his purchase of the property. However, as in White, where the present owner was able to sue a previous owner who had actually caused and contributed to the discharge, under §181(1) and §181(5) Mr. Sunoco may be able to apportion his liability. Although there is no definitive time frame as to when the leak occurred, the odds that it occurred the same day Mr. Sunoco purchased the gas station is astronomical. Therefore, it is likely that the USTs have been leaking since Mr. Tesoro was the owner, allowing Mr. Sunoco to sue Mr. Tesoro in strict liability for cleanup costs and damages to the community. Further, Mr. Sunoco may also be able to share liability and sue Lukoil, since Lukoil is the present operator of the gas station and further contributed to the USTs leaking by failing to properly reconcile the UST measurements and concealing this information from Mr.
(i) 3 categories of standards of care: 1. Trespasser: very limited duty. No negligence duty, though in the Katko case the P recovered (the landowner cannot engage in intentional or reckless conduct). 2. Licensee: allowed to be there.
The Definiteness Requirement Prevails (Essay Question 1 Page 160) Sarah Brown Bethel University John Stevens’ dilapidated apartment got a fresh, new remodeling job done at the expense of the Chesneys, and now, after being evicted, the Chesneys are seeking the value of the work they had done. We are going to take a look at this from a few different angles, and then I will inform whether or not the Chesneys are entitled. The defendant never promised to keep the tenants under his lease for life, or for any other certain amount of time (other than what the lease states, which is not the issue here). But, with that being said, are there unusual reasons to hold the landlord liable anyway? This is tricky question and there is a clear ethical issue here.
This thinking is also reflected in the Privy Council case of Air Jamaica v Charlton 1999, where Lord Millet said: “But [a resulting trust] arises whether or not the transferor intended to retain a beneficial interest - he almost always does not - since it responds to the absence of any intention on his part to pass a beneficial interest to the recipient.” This argument was put forward in the recent theses of Birks-Chambers that the the key to the resulting trust was not the intention to create a trust, but the intention of the donor not to benefit the recipient. The statement by Lord Browne-Wilkinson however shows a flawed approach at looking at intention by means of deducing a presumed intention. To presume an intention would be going against the fundamentals of trust. To create a trust the intention must be manifested or expressed and the the courts have placed increasing importance on the intention of the parties when determining whether there is a trust or not. The perceived artificiality of presumed intentions in the resulting trust doctrine has led courts to move away from it affirmed by the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17; [2007] A.C. 432.