Opposition In Russia

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How effective was opposition to Russian government during the period 1855-1964? All Russian governments in this period faced strong opposition to their regime with the period as a whole punctuated by riots, disturbances and revolutions. This question largely hinges on the definition of the word opposition, and one understands it here as an individual or group which resists and combats the ideology, nature, and mechanisms used by the ruling party. From this definition emerge two different classes of opposition in this period, from inside and outside the circles of the ruling elite. For the opposition inside the circles of the ruling elite (the gentry in imperial Russia and fellow Bolsheviks with slightly different political inclinations in…show more content…
The bulk of the opposition looked across to Europe where they saw constitutional monarchies leading countries forward into prosperity, whereas Lenin (inspired by Chernyshevsky’s book ‘What is to be done’) studied Marxist theory which promoted the idea of socialism via a dictatorship of the proletariat. The first main success of political opposition is widely considered to be the assassination of Alexander II at the hands of the People’s Will in 1881. Although assassinating the Emperor is an extraordinary feat it is hotly debated whether or not this event helped the opposition achieve their aims (presumably greater political freedom/democracy). On the eve of his death Alexander II was willing to consider Loris Melikov’s proposal of the public playing a more prominent role in directing administrative and financial policy. Furthermore, the assassination caused Alexander III and Konstantin Pobedonostev to inaugurate an age of constant political reaction in which many counter-reforms were created to limit the impact of the Great Reforms in the 1860’s (for example the University Statute of 1884 concerning autonomy of higher education replaced the much more progressive statute of 1863). Perhaps the…show more content…
The astonishing frequency of peasant revolts in the six years and two months of Alexander II’s reign prior to the Emancipation Edict (474 revolts, accounting for 32% of all peasant revolts in 19th century Russia according to Ignatovich’s figures) was clearly a contributory factor. The result was the abolition of human bondage which was, if nothing else, an increase in status for Russian peasants. The effectiveness of peasant opposition to serfdom can be contrasted with their reluctance under Stalin to become part of collective farms or kolkhoz which had to deliver an assigned amount of grain to the state. They even slaughtered their own resources to spite Stalin, with the number of horses declining from 34 to 16.6 million between 1929 and 1933. However, collectivization could not be averted and this time peasant revolts was not enough to direct government policy in their favour. Revolts relating to living and working standards were not even tolerated by the weakest Communist and Tsarist regimes, with Nicholas II massacring workers at Lena Goldfields in 1912 and Khrushchev’s KGB lashing out at riots due to food shortages at Novocherkassk in
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