Mexican Treasury Case Study

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2.3 THE DATA Auctions for 30-day Mexican Treasury bills was considered for the period August 1986 to July 1991 to examine the bidding behaviour of both the discriminatory with the uniform price regime, focusing on the auction of one-month peso-denominated zero-coupon securities CETES. The data also consisted of a complete set of participant-identified competitive and non-competitive bids, maximum winning discounts, the aggregate competitive and non-competitive quantities allocated and the quantity-weighted average discount of the resale done on Wednesday at the Mexico City money market. However, converting the discount to prices auction quantity and profit figures are converted into U.S. dollars for ease of interpretation by first rebasing…show more content…
On average, $179 million and $27 million were assigned to both competitive and non-competitive bidders respectively. The ratio of the quantity-weighted average resale price to the quantity-weighted average price of winning competitive bids average 1.000171 across auctions using a basis point of 1.71 with the t- statistics of 7.81, he thus, observed that the figure is highly significantly statistical. Observing this table above, out of the 207 auctions in the sampling period, average bidders submitted 94.2 competitive bids with a wide variation between the maximum and minimum sample wide of 184 and 19 respectively. For, the competitive bidders it average 24.7 ranging between 40 and 13. The number of winning competitive bids average 39.9, but varied widely between the minimum of 2 and the maximum of 157. For the noncompetitive bid having an average of 33.7 with the maximum of 69 and minimum of zero well, this is because an auction was cancelled completely in August 1998. More also, calculating the quantity-weighted variance of winning bid price using this: ∑_(i=1)^N▒〖(b_i - b_w)〗 2 * V_i ∕ ∑_(i=1)^N▒Vi Where b_i: Price of the ith winning…show more content…
B. Summary of statistics on competitive bidders’ performance in 207 discriminatory and uniform Mexican Treasury 30 days bill auctions. Using table 2 we could notice that it excludes 49 additional competitive participants who failed to submit any winning bids and we can observe that 58 bidders bided for the competitive bids during this sampling period and also some other activities carried out by them which are indicated by different column explained

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