Yet, if we observe that pleasure is good, we should be able to ask is good pleasure. However if an individual gains pleasure through inflicting harm can we conclude that good and pleasure are one and the same thing? In short ethical naturalism is unable to define good, yet continues to claim that ethical language is based on objective truth. Non Cognitive approaches to meta ethics such as emotivism and prescriptivism argue that ethical language is subjective. A. J. Ayer claims that ethical language
The first argument, that subjectivism creates infallible moral agents, reads as follows. In subjectivism, to say something is bad is to say one has a bad feeling about it. As one can not be mistaken about their feelings, one can not be mistaken about moral judgements. For those who have encountered someone with very objectionable moral viewpoints however, perhaps violent homophobia or racism, it seems obtuse to suppose such people to be as equally moral as a loving and accepting person. The argument concludes with the claim that, despite the supposed infallibility, people are often mistaken in their moral judgements.
The various forms present two major problems; the problem of justice, and the issue of having to predict the consequences of an action. One variant within utilitarianism is Hedonistic or Classic utilitarianism. Which looks at the view ‘what is good for an individual is what tends to promote happiness or pleasure to the individual’. This holds that the only intrinsic good is pleasure, and that the only intrinsic bad is pain. Everything else is good only insofar as it creates pleasure, and bad only insofar as it creates pain.
He also believed that the most important characteristic of our personalities is created by how we treat others. While Chuang Tzu preached that things are categorized as good or evil. Everything is everything, and we make our own opinions on the level of goodness or the amount of evil. Chuang Tzu is also a complete anarchist. He believed that the world “does not need governing; in fact it should not be governed.” He also proclaimed that good order results spontaneously when things are let alone.
The evidential argument from evil is necessitated through the lack of closure provided by another argument - the logical problem of evil, a proposition which attempts to assert that God and Evil are logically incompatible. It is largely rebutted by Alvin Plantinga’s free will defence, stating that for God ‘To create creatures capable of moral good…He must create creatures capable of moral evil’ , thereby arguing that the very presence of evil in the world does not count against God’s existence as ‘He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility of moral good.’ Plantinga’s defence is thus based on the concept of libertarian free will, that free will is incompatible with determinism and so even an all-knowing god could not stop humans from committing morally wrong acts. This defence is readily accepted by most philosophers, leading to the creation of the Evidential Argument from Evil – an argument that similarly prescribes to a key facet of anti-theistic arguments; that if one can prove the absence of benefits one may expect to be bestowed on mankind under an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good God – namely a world without evil - then one may attempt to disprove such a God’s very existence. It is regularly cited as the most powerful argument against the existence of God, and differs from the logical argument in the sense that it attempts to illustrate not that the existence of God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil but rather the presence of moral and natural evils in the world damages theistic interpretations of a higher being in the sense that it lowers the likelihood of such a being’s existence. However it should be noted that the evidential argument from evil it is not without its responses – some of which do hold convincing merit.
Because kamma is directly concerned with good and evil, any discussion of kamma must also include a discussion of good and evil. Standards for defining good and evil are, however, not without their problems. What is "good," and how is it so? What is it that we call "evil," and how is that so? These problems are in fact a matter of language.
Hume concluded that the three points are inconsistent. If God is omnipotent, He is aware of existing evil and suffering, and knows how to put a stop to it. If God is omnibenevolent He will want to put a stop to it. If God is both of these attributes, then evil cannot exist. Since we know evil and suffering is a necessary bi-product of human life, we must acknowledge that evil does exist.
However, in the case that he lacked omnibenevolence, evil would still cast a dark shadow in the world because perhaps God does not desire to relieve it. In actuality, God can be all three, and evil can and does exist. This is true because God is not responsible for the evil in the world. Evil blemishes the world wherever the world is lacking in goodness. If evil did not taint the world, the world would lack good and freewill, too.
(webspace.ship.edu/) An Epicurean mindset is that this life will be over and there is nothing else.With Epicurus's one constant problem with God was evil. This is Epicurus's argument when asked: Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Since every ethical system should evaluate itself as the best and only moral system, and every other system is flawed and immoral, it is assumed that moral judgements about ethical systems are meaningless. Moral Relativism rests on the belief that values are subjective. It is holds the belief that there is no objective morality, that there is no such thing as right or wrong, good or evil. Only that, moral systems are just made up and supported by the circumstances of the action. Moral Relativism cannot and does not accept the idea that an objective moral system exists.