Coastal Enclave Strategy (American Revolution)

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QUESTION: How might a coastal “enclave” strategy have fared in suppressing or ending the rebellion as opposed to the three phases of British strategy, which relied on operational concepts of regional pacification and main force engagement with the Continental Army? From 1775 to 1776 Great Britain had a three-phase strategy, which relied on operational concepts of regional pacification and the quick destruction of the Continental Army. From 1777 on forward, the British military leadership began to realized what started as a rebellion was going to be a long protracted war. A coastal enclave strategy, using pacification, economics, and well thought out military policy and vision in the part of the British Crown would have fared better in suppressing the colonial rebellion. Part of the early British three-phase strategy was simple; to isolate New England, the heart of the rebellion; occupy New York and link up with a force marching south from Canada, thus cutting off New England from the rest of the colonies. Great Britain had everything in place. It had the economic leverage and the military force to go with it. To make this strategy work, the British assumed that they had enough Loyalists support and their only objective was not to agitate the neutrals into siding with the independence movement. Militarily, in order for the strategy to succeed, they only needed a decisive victory over Washington's fledgling army. However, the colonial leaders argued that the outcome of the Revolution depended upon keeping an army in the field harassing the British and merely had to avoid losing. Both George Washington in the northern campaign, and Nathaniel Greene in the southern campaign, executed similar strategies. Both leaders actively avoided direct battle with the British Army except when strategically useful. They looked for opportunities to attack isolated
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