Chapter 17 Capital Structure: Limits to the Use of Debt

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CHAPTER 17 CAPITAL STRUCTURE: LIMITS TO THE USE OF DEBT 2. The statement is incorrect. If a firm has debt, it might be advantageous to stockholders for the firm to undertake risky projects, even those with negative net present values. This incentive results from the fact that most of the risk of failure is borne by bondholders. Therefore, value is transferred from the bondholders to the shareholders by undertaking risky projects, even if the projects have negative NPVs. This incentive is even stronger when the probability and costs of bankruptcy are high. 4. Stockholders can undertake the following measures in order to minimize the costs of debt: 1) Use protective covenants. Firms can enter into agreements with the bondholders that are designed to decrease the cost of debt. There are two types of protective covenants. Negative covenants prohibit the company from taking actions that would expose the bondholders to potential losses. An example would be prohibiting the payment of dividends in excess of earnings. Positive covenants specify an action that the company agrees to take or a condition the company must abide by. An example would be agreeing to maintain its working capital at a minimum level. 2) Repurchase debt. A firm can eliminate the costs of bankruptcy by eliminating debt from its capital structure. 3) Consolidate debt. If a firm decreases the number of debt holders, it may be able to decrease the direct costs of bankruptcy should the firm become insolvent. 6. There are two major sources of the agency costs of equity: 1) Shirking. Managers with small equity holdings have a tendency to reduce their work effort, thereby hurting both the debt holders and outside equity holders. 2) Perquisites. Since management receives all the benefits of increased perquisites but only shoulder a fraction of the cost, managers have an incentive to overspend on luxury

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