In the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley presents himself as Philonous, which literally means as “lover of mind”. Hylas is his contemporary philosophical adversary, literally meaning “matter”, which Hylas aptly argues in favor of in the dialogue. Here I am going to present his views on reality as a mind-dependent subjective sense of ideas, rather than something materialistic, which is taken from his first dialogue. The dialogue begins with Hylas encountering Philonous on an early morning and asking him a question that he has been contemplating about for some time, that there is no such thing as mind-independent material objects in the world, only ideas and the minds that have them (by mind-independent material objects he means object whose existence can be shown in the real tangible world and not in the form of ideas). His stance is against this proposition and feels Philonous would agree with him.
This means truth that exists outside of bias and perspective (Doll, Lueders and Morgan, 2006). The third opposition is "an opposition between a self or consciousness that is turned outward in an effort to apprehend and attach itself to truth and true knowledge and a self or consciousness that is turned inward in the direction of its own prejudices, which, far from being transcended, continue to inform its every word and action" (HB, 1611L). Fish is stating that the third opposition is consciousness searching for truth and true knowledge (Doll, Lueders and Morgan, 2006). Each of these oppositions is attached in turn an
With respect to the two papers, I want to show (1) reasons for accepting or denying Self-Predication, (2) how this assumption leads one to a metaphysical or epistemological interpretation of the TMA, and (3) how this assumption determines their different views of the structure of the TMA. In the final section of Vlastos’ paper, Vlastos gives us his critique of only three discrepancies he has with Sellars’ interpretation of Self-Predication. It’s important to understand first why one should accept or deny the view of Self-Predication. And though it seems like a minor debate within the whole argument, the implications of either one’s assumption determines the reasons for many of their other discrepancies on the TMA as a whole. The first problem for Vlastos consists of Sellars’ attempt to discredit Self-Predication within the language used by Plato.
For Descartes’ in the 16th century, the ability to discern truth was a matter of paramount importance. How do we know what we know? Descartes subjected all ideas to skepticism and doubt in order to find a foundation for knowledge. He argued if there was any way in which he could imagine that something that he thought he knew was true wasn’t true, then he could not say for certain that it was true. Descartes expounds on his “Method of Doubt” in three stages: the “Argument from Illusion,” “Dream Skepticism,” and the “Evil Genius.” The first two stages allude to the inclination of humans to be deceived by their own senses, and the third argument was essentially a thought experiment for Descartes, and will not be considered here.
Heidegger's Critique of Cartesianism Heidegger is one of the few Western thinkers to have succeeded in going beyond the Western philosophic tradition. Because his radical criticism is believed to have fractured the foundations of modern philosophy, his thinking is usually at the center of the controversy between the defenders of the tradition and those who wish to break with it and start afresh. In the heat of this debate, the question of Heidegger's place in relation to that tradition in general and to Cartesianism in particular has been neglected. I wish to address the question by focusing on the major aspects of Heidegger's critique of Cartesian philosophy and the modern tradition. I will first show that the strength of his criticism lies in its all-encompassing penetration of the foundations of modern philosophy, running through both the ontological and epistemological channels.
On the one hand, it indicates that Mead is concerned with the historical locus of philosophy and its tasks in his time. On the other, he defines the task of contemporary philosophy as taking seriously ‘the proposition that reality exists in a present’. How are we supposed to understand this proposition?” (Joas, 1985, pg168). As Joas (1985) points out, maybe one the main problems arising from an examination of Meads theories in Philosophy of the Present is the confusion created by Mead skipping from one theory to the next and his disconnected arguments. This is due to the fact that Mead only intended his manuscript to be used as an aid to his lectures.
Therefore, it can be presumed that specific types of harm such as constructive criticism and disciplinary punishment are deemed unjust when they actually can be efficient instruments in the formation of a just human being. Book I of Plato’s Republic commences with the first account of justice which is proposed by Cephalus. Cephalus claims that the greatest good an elderly man can possess is a just consciousness(3).However, he offers an unclear understanding of justice, but through further clarification by Socrates, Cephalus’s outlook on justice becomes defined as being truthful and giving back what is owed (3). Before Cephalus can even ratify Socrates’s allegation of justice, he is interrupted by Polemarchus who claims he agrees with Cephalus’s assertion. Socrates dismisses this argument by offering an insightful refutation.
Hume’s and Kant’s approach to knowledge Arguably, Hume was the most influential British empiricist philosopher. His intention to reform what he saw as a mistaken philosophical system led him to elaborate a new doctrine of knowledge where reason and experience were – quite sharply – separated and confined to different realms. In fact, at the centre of his philosophical system lays the notion of ‘impressions and ideas’ as the only way to gain knowledge. He argues that knowledge is based on impressions, which are the vivid and direct sensorial experiences with things; and ideas, which are mental representations of these impressions. Hume distinguishes simple from complex ideas and makes the claim that “all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones”.
In Rene Descartes’, First Meditation, he analyzes the system of beliefs in anticipation that he would come to find truth. In his rationalist argument on universal doubt, he explains his theory that for us to know the truth we must first be sure that the belief is unquestionable and to do so, we first need to put all of our beliefs into question. We will also be concerned with Putnam’s argument that if you were a Brain in a Vat you would not be able to self refer. I will argue against the application of such high Universal Doubt but nevertheless, I will accept that some doubt is necessary in order to find the truth in your beliefs. Although, Descartes and Putnam are playing devils advocate I will fully argue for Putnam’s discretization of the Brain in the Vat theory.
In this essay I am going to systematically outline these three arguments whilst also looking at some of the counter arguments against them before finally formulating a personal assessment as to the weight of his claim. The doubting argument is the first Descartes expresses in favour of his dualism. It is essentially a manipulation of his ‘i think therefore i am’ as he observes that while he can call into question the existence of his body, it is impossible for him to doubt the existence of his mind and that he is thinking as through the very act of doubting he would express thought. From this he deduces that due to the fact that the existence of one can be doubted and that of the other cannot, mind and body must be distinct. The argument is laid out as such: Premise 1: I can doubt that my body exists.