Soft Budget Constraint

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Soft Budget Constraint is the major problem that causes the failure of SOE reform. It mainly refers to the situation that when there is no commitment to ex ante plan. In the following context, we will use SBC to represent soft budget constraint. From the perspective of SOE managers, the softening of the budget constraint means strict relationship between expenditure and earnings has been relaxed as excess expenditure over earnings will be paid by some other institution, typically by the state. A further condition of ‘softening’ is that the decision-making expects such external financial assistance with high probability and this probability is firmly built into his behaviour. In this presentation, we argue that SBC may worsen moral hazard problem, which may further negatively affect the OPERATION efficiency of SOE. In China, SOEs are state owned. For managers, there is a separation of ownership and control, which may lead to the issue that managers lack motivation to work hard and improve the performance of the firm. SBC worsens moral hazard problem, as under the scheme, there is no bankruptcy in the state sector. The over-guaranteed and under-regulated policies further provide SOE’s managers a shield in case of operation failure and make them more reliable on the government support and protection. Regarding to operation efficiency, we claim that SBC can lead to over-investment and over-expenditure. In 1979, Kornai, suggested that SBC generates serious shortages in socialist economies because SOE engage in excessive investment. Some Hong Kong researchers, Clement, Frank and Kit further demonstrated the assumption by testing China’s listed companies from the period 1997 to 2003. They had three finding. Firstly, within the moral hazard problem, investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. Secondly, SBC will deteriorate the situation by

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