He says that there are many other actions that are holy. How can only persecuting religious offenders be pious? (4e-6e) Euthyphro instead attempts to give Socrates a more general definition. He says that what is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to the gods is impious. Socrates is again unsatisfied with this definition because the gods are always feuding with one another.
The second horn says that since God is on the side of something therefore it is considered to be right or pious. Now, Socrates and Euthyphro was follower of the first horn of dilemma. They both thought that since something is pious therefore God loves it. It is evident from the statement, “Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees” (Plato, 2008).
|Socrates says, “Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and|Socrates has found a flaw in Euthyphro’s claim that whatever the gods like | |the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and |must be holy. Simply by stating that sometimes the gods disagree about what | |the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two |they like, Socrates has logically shown that this can’t be the way to judge
First, when Euthyphro defines piety as “doing as I am doing”, Euthyphro is meaning that holiness is prosecuting religious offenders. Euthyphro feels that in prosecuting his father that he is following the example of the gods, and particularly Zeus, the most just if all gods. Socrates seems to find the first definition unsatisfying, he points out that the gods often quarrel, so what is agreeable to one might not be agreeable to all. Socrates then asks Euthyphro to again define piety. The second argument, Socrates has is that piety and impiety are opposites, and that the gods are always in a state of discord.
Yet it is the continent person whom Kant calls virtuous and to whom Kant ascribes moral worth. Moral value is exhibited by the subduing of fickle passion by objective deliberation. This conflict, most famously illustrated by the differences between Aristotle and Kant, raises the question: Which state of character is best described as virtuous? I think progress can be made toward answering this question by asking a more probing question: Why are we interested in the concept of virtue? It turns out that Aristotle and Kant would give rather different answers to this question.
Deborah Avie, 9/13/2012, Phil, 3301(Bohorquez 1st paper) Although Euthyphro attempts to justify his actions by resorting to his religious knowledge and belief of piety having to have a universal understanding to both parties, relationships between justice and pious acts. Socrates argues that these actions or not justification but instead misguided, together Euthypro and Socrates have some kind of dilemma. Socrates try to get Euthyphro to agree that piety is a part of justice. This dialogue has implication for any ethical theory, or theory of value in general, that identifies rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness, which are being commanded or forbidden by a god, or gods. While attempting to explain the reasoning in Euthyhro piety is a part of justice, we first have to understand the Venn diagram of a just act, and a pious act, this method bring about
In Plato’s The Republic, there exists a struggle between the characters of Socrates and Thrasymachus to find the correct definition of what justice is. Thrasymachus, being a Sophist, expressed his views on justice in a manner of rash sequences whereby Socrates closely followed behind with his own counter-arguments. These counter-arguments effectively exposed weaknesses in Thrasymachus’s argument for justice, and further crippled it entirely. By outlining and explaining Thrasymachus’s views on justice, I will argue two things; first that the weakness in his argument comes from only himself in abandoning his method. Secondly, that justice may be our deep-rooted understanding and ability to identify good from evil.
For a conscientious observer, this double standard should seriously cause him to question the ability of a consequentialist perspective to prescribe satisfactory moral understanding and guidance. By accommodating an agent’s moral feelings only when they are in accord with utility is indicative of a deeper failure to recognize that such feelings are often expressions of the agent’s own projects and commitments. Thus, to achieve an objective standard of right action, utilitarianism ultimately sacrifices the agent’s integrity by making right action irrelevant to those projects and commitments. The first part of my exposition focuses on what Williams sees as the reason for the popularity of consequentialist ethical theories, which is rooted in an illicit jump from thinking about moral kinds of actions to thinking about moral degrees of outcomes. The rest of my exposition explains how this jump directly leads to the
This leading into the definitions of piety. The first definition that Euthyphro suggests to Socrates is that piety is persecuting religious offenders. However, Socrates is not satisfied with this response because there are many pious actions that do not involve persecution. (page 5 e) The second definition that Euthyphro suggests is that piety is what is dear to the gods, and that what some gods may agree on, others may not agree on. Thus saying that what is pious may be not pious concluding in a contradiction.
What is sin? ” is addressed (5). Euthyphro’s dilemma is explained by Panos Dimas in his article when he says that if something is “loved by the gods….Socrates characterizes it as something that happens to it and therefore presupposes that the pious has already been constituted” (2). What this means is that we cannot be sure of what is good or bad because we do not know the real essence of what piety is. The basic question of the dilemma is: are morals considered ethical because the gods says so or do the gods say morals are ethical because they actually are?