Is Mackie’s argument from relativity compelling? Mackie’s ‘Ethics: Inventing right and wrong’ critically assesses the idea that there are, or even can be, objective moral truths, and exposits Mackie’s ‘moral relativist’ stance. I intend also in this essay to criticise the idea of moral objectivity, and to deal with the objections that could be potentially raised to a relativist stance. The most obvious task, it would seem, to begin with when assessing the idea of moral objectivity, is to come to an understanding about what is literally meant by ‘an objective moral truth’. The word objective immediately brings to mind a state of actual existence, as opposed to simply ideal existence.
Habermas critiques Gadamer’s thought by questioning the overall concept and the central role of tradition, arguing the possibilities of certain sub-conscious interests and specific authorial forces that distort tradition. In order to accurately explore the thoughts and beliefs of Gadamer and Habermas surrounding that of the concept of “tradition”, one must first establish the basic foundation of hermeneutics upon which these ideas are to be centred. Heidegger offers an effective ground on which to base the majority of these philosophical positions for that of classical hermeneutics by initially revealing hidden meanings in hermeneutical texts, exploring authoritative objectives and developing a clearer overall understanding of them. A later shift in focus in hermeneutics during the 20th century brought about an apparent lean toward specifically “epistemological foundations… or the methodological principles which lead to objective knowledge in the human sciences” (Ormiston, G & Schrift, A, 1990), thus encouraging the questioning of knowledge to be centred upon that of “truth” and “Being”. To Heidegger, it is the former understanding which leads to a solid basis of
This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth; it cannot in fact be used 'to tell' at all.’ However if we understand
Operant Conditioning Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), an early twentieth century psychologist, was the first to formulate what he referred to as the Law of Effect. The Law of Effect, simply stated, proposed that any behavior that resulted in pleasant consequences would tend to be repeated, while any behavior that resulted in unpleasant consequences would not. Thorndike later discovered what he termed Spread of Effect. Not only would any behavior that resulted in pleasant consequences be repeated, but also any responses surrounding the reinforced one (Hergenhahn & Olson, 2005, 69). Building on the earlier work of Thorndike, B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) began to elaborate and extend Thorndike’s ideas on learned behavior.
Empiricism vs Rationalism The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw complicated debate between empiricists and rationalists, in which physics, mathematics, theology and logic were called into discussion. The sources of out knowledge can be divided into two different sources, what enter our mind through the use of senses, and what enters our mind through the use of reasoning. Empiricism is the idea that knowledge comes from the sense, while rationalism is the notion that knowledge is discovered by the reason. In order to gain knowledge, use of sense and reason must coexist together. In my opinion, one cannot gain any knowledge without sense and reasoning.
I will explain the basic ideas of functionalism and explain how common-sense plays a role in the theory. I will then present one objection to the common-sense functionalism theory and form a hypothesis of how a common-sense functionalist would respond to the objection. Lastly, I will present my own evaluation of the common-sense functonalism theory. Functionalism, in simple terms, is the doctrine that the function of an object should determine its design and materials. It is a doctrine in the philosophy of mind according to which mental states are defined by their causes and effects.
This essay shall be based around these issues. Firstly, the key themes regarding Descartes shall be introduced, before an examination of his notion of the cogito. Possible flaws in these conclusions, with particular reference to Lacan shall be discussed, before outlining the problems ‘psychology’ faces if its Cartesian foundation is incorrect. The focus of this essay is to examine the nature of the cogito, and what implications this has for psychology if it is in some way flawed. Yet before analysing this, it is important to consider the main ideas behind Descartes’ meditations.
Because it engages the whole self without a fixed yardstick it can be called a personal reflection…. [I]n this reflection the self is in question; what is at stake is the definition of those inchoate evaluations which are sensed to be essential to our identity (117). Taylor makes this claim about responsibility for self in opposition to Sartre’s characterization of the human condition as nothingness and absolute freedom. Sartre derives from this condition an understanding of freedom as the radical, infinite openness of the freedom of our choices and concludes that it is this freedom that characterizes our fundamental moral dilemma. Taylor argues that it is not the weight of the openness that defines our moral selves or the moral dilemmas we face, but the fact that various choices necessarily blind and pull us in different directions.
He argued that they were part of the structure of the mind and that we would have no experience without them. He says that sight, smell, touch etc. are all meaningless to us unless they are brought under these innate concepts. Kant believes in a world beyond our conceptual scheme called the noumenal world which he says we can know nothing about and it is impossible to discuss. People have criticized this view by say that how can Kant know that the Noumenal world exists if there is no evidence of it.
However, in the process of experience, human cannot feel the “feeling” using the concepts of that “feeling”, which is named Qualia. For example, although someone has learnt all the theories he should know to generate the sense of pain, he can’t predict the result when the sense of pain really happens. Therefore, Qualia cannot be simply identified by physical knowledge, because it is subjective, and will change with environment’s change. In order to make the argument more convictive, Frank Jackson designed an experiment to explain that Qualia is nonphysical, and