Natural Law, Interpretativism and Realism:

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NATURAL LAW, INTERPRETATIVISM AND REALISM: NEW LEGAL REALISM Michael Yee Introduction Miles and Sunstein's article describes the emergence of empirical studies of judicial behaviour in the last decade indicating the rise of a new movement that they call "New Legal Realism". Miles and Sunstein argues the growth and relevance of this movement by discussing the distinction of "movements" in law, furthering Llewellyn's attempts to capture the “empirical goals of legal realists” by abstraction of reported cases to make large scale quantitative studies of facts and outcome.[1] In this essay I will argue that whilst Miles and Sunstein conduct a compelling investigation, supported by interesting methodology, their claims often displace our focus on some plausible differences while ignoring many important similarities between these movements. Considering this, it is unclear if the differences are really significant enough to justify the label, and thus invokes an argument with an underlying hindsight bias. I will then attempt to form a more thorough argument through drawing similarities between judicial interpretations of conventional semantic meanings of statutory and constitutional texts, linking them back to an understanding of systematic differences in existing legal topography. This will aid in expanding their research beyond the limitations of the “new realist”approach, where each factor is treated as an empirical hypothesis, subject to test. Foundations of New Legal Realism Although it draws on classical Legal Realism from the first half of the twentieth century, New Legal Realism (NLR) differs, mainly, in it's projection beyond it's predecessor's emphasis on judges, courts, and formal legal systems. NLR by a “ground-level up” structure, which focuses on non-expert experiences with law as well as studying legal

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