• Was there discussion on justification of a contract? • Was there an agreement on the details of the relationship that contained sufficient certainty on the establishment of a contract? Result: • The claim made by the plaintiff had failed since the judges decided that the parties did not appear to have any legal relations intended. • Appeal by the plaintiff was not allowed but a cross-appeal was. Reasons: • Precedent from the case Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 shows that a promissory estoppel cannot create a cause of action.
Therefore, at the end of a case (civil) there will be a judgement in which the judge will give not only the decision but also the legal reasoning which lies behind it. There are two main principles that are involved in judicial precedent; these are ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum. Ratio decidendi is the legal reason or principal which lays behind the decision and it is this ratio which will provide the precedent for judges to follow in future cases. The remainder of the judgement Obiter Dicta are statements made “by the way”. These comments do not form part of the reasoning and are therefore not part of the precedent.
The court only decides on the legal principles. Examine what law there is and apply it to the facts. Facts of the contract: Between 1972 to 1978, Mrs. Stern was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, which in effect would render her infertile. The couple decided to go for surrogate parentin. Mrs. Whitehead volunteered to join the surrogate program for the purpose of “giving the most loving gift of happiness to an unfortunate couple” and also help her in supporting her children’s education.
This could possible arise from the contract that was signed by Wayne’s son. However, there are several reasons why this action may not be found in favor of Marshall. The first argument that Wayne would have in regards to this contract; would be the capacity to bind Wayne under this contract. There is no mention that the son is acting as an agent of the company and therefore would not be authorized to sign a contract for the company. In Gebhard v. Garnier (1876) it was found that a court cannot bind a person to a contract, if that contract was signed by a person with no authority to do so.
It was said that the marriage didn’t guarantee “the fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex.” Also it was said that the marriage exclusion does not offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. From my knowledge, I know that you can only get married to the same sex in San Francisco, California and in Canada. In the Loving v. Virginia case, the Fourteenth Amendment was on their side by stating that marriage shouldn’t be restricted by invidious racial discrimination. Under the Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a person of another race resides with the individual and
In contract law, the goal is to determine, from a given set of facts, whether legal obligation and duties will arise in a contract. A common approach is to identify the facts that must accompany promissory words in order to have legal effects. The issue under discussion in this paper will be to determine whether “a promise to do what a person is already obliged to do can or cannot constitute consideration”. This paper will categorize considerations in pre-existing duties into three separate categories: 1. Performance of contractual duty already owed to the promisor, 2.
Integrating the two roles can be challenging ethically, morally, and legally because mediation transpires when parties advocate different positions. An ethical challenge of assuming the dual-role of advocate and mediator is that of conflict of interest. For example, the main interest for the advocate is to support their cause, whereas the main interest for the mediator is to stay neutral and not take sides. Meaning, the mediator does not support a specific cause. A moral challenge of the dual-role of an advocate and mediator is that of moral conflict.
The team members involved in the dispute will not be forced to participate in the mediation process. If the dispute cannot be settled an arbitration clause will follow. This clause will be enforced for members who were not able to reach an agreement through
→Court said examiner does not act as counsel, but as fact-finder. →Court says P has due process rights; didn’t USE subpoena power to cross examine witness. **Lesson is due process is really only about opportunity to participate. →Differed from Wong case because it was NOT an adversarial proceeding; fact finding body not dealing with adversarial claims, so examiner roles were not in conflict. →**take home: If you want to make a due process claim, need to make the argument that it is an adversarial proceeding wherein prosecutorial and judicial roles are being conflated.
Policy – two parties to a dispute [Organisation] cannot offer advice to both parties as it cannot act in the best interest of both clients and its impartiality could be questioned. It may offer preliminary information to any caller on first contact with the service but should not knowingly offer advice to the second party in any dispute once the first party has consulted it. Similarly, it cannot advise a party in dispute with someone who is part of [Organisation] staff or Board of Directors. 2. Procedure to avoid