Film-based digital imaging also took hold. Kodak executives stuck to current film strategy in spite of detailed analysis of threats posed by digital photography. They found it hard to ignore the fact that film and traditional processing provided for majority of the revenue stream. They underestimated the significance of market changes and the disruption that was coming. Digital technology also eliminated the huge recurring revenue stream that came from film and reprints.
In the case of Apple, will Japan ever take their products seriously going forward, or will they always be thought of as a little behind the times? In the case of Hong Kong Disney, the wholesome family friendly household brand has now been associated with environmental degradation and not supportive of renewable resources. Case One: Japan to Apple’s iPhone: “No Thanks!” Apple underestimates the impact of the iPhone in Japanese markets. Apple did not take into consideration that Japan is one of the leading technological hotspots in the world when it comes to wireless technology, so while the rest of the world has been racing to catch up to the 3G speeds that Apple boasts in their newer device, Japan saw it as old news. Additionally, Apple was not able to integrate the higher quality digital displays that the Japanese are accustomed to using, which means that it was lacking in comparison to other devices already available in their market.
However, Kodak was a late mover, they did little to prepare for when digital photography would eventually replace film. Kodak used a hybrid approach to this problem; to use digital photography to improve film like CEO George Fisher in 1995 said himself, that Kodak was making, “step by step progression of enhansing photography using digital technology”. All this would happen simultaneously to developing new digital products, entering new possible markets and increasing their acquisitions and alliances. Kodak’s core competencies turned into core rigidities. In terms of design, Kodak made the first simple camera in 1888, it transformed something complicated to simple.
Kodak was filing false allegations against the company, claiming that Fuji was engaging in anticompetitive trade patterns, and thereby utilizing the political process as well as the issues surrounding U.S. and Japanese trade to gain some of the competitive advantage it had lost with the growth of Fuji. As a result, it was only appropriate that Fuji would retaliate in order to defend itself from those false allegations. According to Fuji’s lawyers, there seemed to be many hole in Kodak’s complaint such as the fact that Kodak had overlooked its own market dominance in the U.S. in comparison to Fuji, as well as the provision in Section 301 about filing complaints. 2. Why is Kodak using this strategy?
Meanwhile, the case study of Kodak will supplement to each aspect. The term of ‘disruptive technology’ was first coined by Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen and he suggested that it is a new technology that unexpectedly replaces the existed technology (Techtarget.com 2006). Carefully speaking, this kind of innovation means another different value network to the existed one and generates a niche market, which will eventually disrupt the existing value network and market (Wikipedia.org 2011). The explanation suggests that the disruptive technology is obviously a threat to the incumbent successful firms. It is undoubted that most successful firms have failed to compete with the entrant firms because of the disruptive technology.
They lower their prices and make their products alternative to competitors that are more expensive. Both companies defraud their consumers by pretending to deliver high culture to the masses (Cave & Klein, 2000). Consumers normally do not recognize the false advertisement because IKEA and Old Navy put their items in popular shows and commercial, so that customers will buy
This is because of the following reasons: * While the specs of Sony 1270 compete with BARCOs flagship graphic projector BG400, it is being aimed at the data segment. This will confuse consumers as the applications and input devices are very different. * Given Sony’s image as a mass producers of low-end products in the projector segment, customers will be unwilling to invest in an untested expensive product. * BARCO’s can capitalize on its reliability and brand image as market innovator in the niche sector , and offer customers the added feature of digital controls in BD700 which will greatly enhance user-friendliness. It is also a POD in vis-à-vis sony 1270.
Why a consumer electronics company would seek to create synergy and value from acquiring a film studio is an interesting proposition to explore. Sony, hurting and bitter from the defeat of its Betamax video recording system to the technologically inferior VHS system, began looking for other ways to ensure its future technologies would find widespread adoption in the media industries. Sony’s management came to believe that proprietary media, made through Columbia, would ensure industry standards for future generations of digital video technology. Furthermore, the value of the dollar had fallen 50 percent against the yen from 1984 to 1989; it was a ripe time for expansion. Prior to Sony’s acquisition, Columbia was managed by a similarly synergy-ambiguous partnership with Coca Cola.
What was once a luxury item became a common commodity, no longer was Autoliv able to charge a premium on airbags which led to “price erosion” (Roussel and Cohen, 40). This issue combined with a supply chain flailing to keep up with production demands, being non homogenous, and declining economic factors led Autoliv to a hard place. Standardized Production In response to the issues Autoliv was facing, Autoliv decided to employ the assistance of their biggest client, Toyota. Toyota created TPS (Toyota Production System), which is the precursor to the lean methodology or lean manufacturing. Toyota also saw the value in assisting Autoliv, because if Toyota assists its suppliers it will upgrade their own supply chain which Toyota views as an asset.
These exercises stemmed Xerox's offer adversity, and the association's triumph over the Japanese was trumpeted in books with titles like Xerox: American Samurai. The accentuation on beating the Japanese, in any case, redirected Xerox's organization from the rising battle for the PC. At the time, Xerox's Palo Alto Investigation Center was leading a couple of the advancements that began the PC distress, including the graphical UI and the mouse. Nevertheless, Xerox was not capable advantage from the new open entryways since they lay outside its key