How Did Hill's Decision To Delay The Confederate

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In the fall of 1863, the Confederate Army under the command of President Jefferson Davis was in dire need of a victory in Tennessee. At this time in the Civil War, success lay on the side of the Union and Jefferson Davis was anxious to seal a decisive victory. The Battle of Chickamauga proved to be just that. However, if it weren’t for the forces of Lt. General Daniel Harvey Hill, the battle would not have ended in favor of the Confederacy. On one side of the argument, it could be said that Hill’s decision to delay the attack was smart in that it would allow his troops to recover and be at one hundred percent. However, Hill’s relationship with Polk and his unsatisfactory performance in the eyes of his commander caused him to be relieved of…show more content…
Hill’s decision to delay the attack on September 20. The first event that transpired on the evening September 19 was the miscommunication between Polk and Hill. As Polk reached his headquarters that night, he instructed his couriers to order Generals Cheatham and Hill to report to him at Thedford’s Ford so that he could issue his orders to attack the enemy at dawn. The courier promptly returned to Polk and reported that Cheatham was notified of the orders and that his army would be prepared for the attack. However, the second courier who was instructed to notify Hill returned and reported that Hill was nowhere to be found. Because Hill was unable to be reached, Polk instructed his courier to issue the orders directly to Generals Breckinridge and Cleburne, two of Hill’s division commanders. Hill, after he found out about these orders from Polk, immediately sent a reply notifying Polk that his forces would not be ready by dawn to attack Rosecrans because they were receiving their first rations in over 24 hours. Several weeks after the battle, Polk issued a statement to Bragg explaining that he found out that Hill had purposely delayed the attack because he was confused as to where Cheatham’s line of battle was in comparison with his. Although this error in judgment may seem monumental, it did not have any effect on the outcome of the battle. Delaying the attack enabled Hill’s troops to rest and put forth their best efforts. The order from Polk was re-issued and the attack was executed on 20 September. The layout of Rosecrans’s forces covered the areas between the Rossville and Dry Valley roads. The line east of the Rossville Road stretched four hundred yards, consisted of Generals’ Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynold’s divisions, and was entrenched behind heavy frameworks of logs. The line that crossed the Dry Valley Road consisted of Sheridan’s and Davis’s
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