A defendant must be represented; however, they do not have the right to choose which counsel they will receive. The attorney must be knowledgeable and competent, but there cannot be any preferential treatment of one lawyer over another based on reputation or perceived abilities of counsel. As long as the attorney has proven to be effective in representing the case, the defendant must be represented by them. Defendants may be able to show just cause about preferring to self-represent, but again, they must show a clear understanding in making the decision to refuse counsel for their case (Tomkovicz, 2002). There are many other limitations of right to counsel, they include the period that is referred to as “noncritical stages”.
Paper Number 2: Gaddis Chapter Six While reading Gaddis’ chapter six, he focused on how to question causation. He uses E.H. Carr’s fatal flaw as a big example for the distinction of “rational” and “accidental” causes. Gaddis also gives an alternative view on procedures of causation, and additional procedures historians need to keep in mind when narrate the reality of history. Carr explains rational causes as, “lead to fruitful generalizations and lessons can be learned from them.” While he says that accidental causes, “teach no lessons and lead to no conclusions.” Gaddis claims that Carr clearly confused himself as well as his readers about the differences between the two. Gaddis claims that not explaining clearly the distinction between rational and accidental causes is the more serious problem with Carr.
Policy is an important consideration for the courts to decide the duty owed by defendants. Lord Bridge suggested that it should be fair, just and reasonable when imposing duty on defendant. It is thought that the imposition of a duty solely base on foreseeability of damage is not desirable. As Winfield and Jolowicz suggests that “the court must decide not simply whether there is or is not a duty, but whether there should or should not be one.” For the purpose of this essay, I will discuss how policy can influence the imposition of duty. The most important policy concern has always been the “floodgates argument”.
A critical evaluation of the impact of the House of Lords decision in the Kennedy (2) case relating to the law of causation is indeed one of interest as it takes a careful look at the laws of causation also known as the transaction principle, its application in whole or in part in the cases to which it applies. First and foremost recognition must be given to the Kennedy case as it accolades such importance that it indeed had and still has an effect on the already existing law of causation if at all there was an impact, and still irks the interest of scholars. This essay will explore in part such pivotal terms as manslaughter, the facts of the case in question and delve deep into the laws of causation, causation itself, determine if indeed the decision of the House of Lords had any effect or impact on the laws of causation. The case went through the court ranks and finally stopping at the house of lords; criminal charges of Homicide-Manslaughter (involuntary manslaughter<constructive manslaughter> to be precise- the unlawful killing without having the intention to kill) were brought against the appellant and the supply of a class A drug with the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c 100), s 23 , it
Secondly, that justice may be our deep-rooted understanding and ability to identify good from evil. My motivation for presenting my own definition stems from my frustration in Thrasymachus’s inability to see justice as something much more than a form of legalism Thrasymachus starts his definition by stating that justice is the interest or advantage of the stronger (338c). Immediately after being questioned by Socrates on this definition, Thrasymachus quickly clarifies that the stronger are in-fact the rulers and that justice is in the interest of them alone (339a). Socrates forces the examination of this definition, and results in Thrasymachus then defining interests as the laws that rulers make (338e). From there, Thrasymachus then states that justice, from the perspective of the ruler, is obeying their laws (339b).
1. Essay Read the following quotation: The constitution is work of many interpretations. The legal system have their interpretation, and so does scholars and the general public. However, the true meaning of the Constitution seems to get lost in the mix of other people’s understanding of it, “The emphasis on historical and theoretical precision sometimes leads us to forget that the Constitution was the work of statesmen and politicians, not philosophers and theorists." (Ivers.
The case of Ricci v. DeStefano presents a conflict created by a law plagued by inherent contradictions within its pragmatic intentions. When discussing the outcome of this case—a ruling in favor of the New Haven firefighters (the petitioners)—beyond the walls of a courtroom, it is perfectly acceptable to engage in emotional debates in attempts to concur with or disagree with the court’s decision. An empirical examination of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, yields an obvious conclusion in this particular case with respect to the empirical, judicial decision rendered by the court. What is most fascinating is that the law’s internal contradiction—the conflict between “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact”—aids, in either
For example, should judges embrace “mind reading” and issue orders based on mere fMRIs? Intentionally crude and tendentious, this sentence was meant to demonstrate that focusing too narrowly on such cases can impoverish our understanding of how science can interact with law. To avoid this fate, we should systematically investigate four separate quadrants, produced by intersecting two conceptual axes based on “specificity” and “time.” Axis of Specificity. Making new law or applying existing law both require some understanding of the “facts”—either the factual contours of a problem to be solved or the factual particularities necessary to apply general legal principles to a specific case. But as legal scholars have noted, facts can be specific or general (e.g., Faigman, 2008).
Each author’s method in integrating the oral history may be different and, to some degree, inadequate, but the presence of oral accounts in their essays give voice to different perspectives of that time. It is evident, then, that altogether the oral history in each essay holds value and plays a significant role in the integrity of each argument. We must be careful, however, to fully accept the perspectives and arguments the author presents to us as definitively as any individual identity in any historical account, including the author, has the power to misinterpret and miscommunicate historical accounts accidently or
He uses several facts in history that are irrefutable to showcase the many extreme lengths at which certain Justices will go for the sole purpose of furthering their own goals. However, on rare occasion he focuses on the Constitutionally trustworthy Justices and their court decisions that have shaped our wonderful nation. Just as there are Justices that have twisted the Constitution to suit their deranged views, there is an equal amount that have shown common sense, and morality in their interpretations of the law. The problem noted in his book is that there are tools set in place for the removal of Supreme Court Justices that have obviously lost their way and warrant such actions however this has not been exercised to the extent that is needed. Article II, Section four of the Constitution provides for the removal of many things to include civil officers such as judges (Levin, 2005).