Critique of Representationalism-Hurserl's Phenomenology

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INTRODUCTION In other to expose Husserl’s phenomenology comprehensively, Matheson outlined two basic critiques on representationalism- the view that consciousness is something like a self enclosed room or box as against the Husserlian view of consciousness as intentional. CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATIONALISM First, the common –sense realist view that we are conscious of the external world because the world streams into the mind via the senses is misguided because the mind is not literally a physical space (like a camera) into which sense-data can ‘stream’- the mind is not the eyeball or the eardrum. Second, the representationalist theory that states that sense-data allow the mind to reconstruct a ‘representation’ of the outside world and consciousness is an indirect experience of these representations is implausible on close inspection because it seems to be incapable of accounting for the truth: how can I know that my representations are true representations of the world if I never have access to the things themselves against which to measure them. If the representationalist is right, says Matheson, then we live exclusively in a world of ‘copies’ or ‘limitations’ without ever seeing the originals, consequently, we are deluded in thinking that we experience the world and possess no criteria for judging truth. For Matheson, Husserl provides a better conceptual ground for rejecting the representationalist theory. For instance, if we try to characterize the relationship between a portrait and the person portrayed, we would not find difficulty in doing this because we can experience both objects, but we cannot do this when it pertain objects of experience because it can never be established as a relation. That which is purportedly represented cannot be pointed out as such. And if I can point out the represented object then the represented object must also be a
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