The second of Hume’s points is that the causal principle is doubtful. His evidence for this is that we can conceive of things without a cause therefore things without a cause are possible this is also backed up by Mackie who says that the causal principle has no evidence and only exists in a methodological sense. However this argument also has severe faults that discredit it. If the arguments from causality are questionable then that means that the arguments from conceivability are questionable as well. This could also mean that a logically necessary truth could be conceived as false if you don’t completely understand it.
The great debate on rationalism versus Empiricism, whether to believe in a priori or a Posteriori knowledge has many of great arguments from both the rationalists and the empiricists. Are you just a, Tabula Rasa, blank slate or is all knowledge formed by Reason? As this debate grabs your mind and twists it to the reality it may already belong in. How can we know anything of itself, are our minds just wandering in an alternate reality? A quote by Albert Einstein “Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one.” one of the most influential people discussing limitations on the rational mind.
Nanx Dakum PHIL 100 TA: Xuan Wang Proff: Dave McElhoes December 2, 2011 ‘A Defense against the Teleological Argument’ ‘Introduction’ In this paper I will argue that the Teleological argument is not a good argument for God’s existence. First I will explain the argument, and then I will object to specific premises of the argument. I will also point out the strengths of the argument and what a theist could say to counter my objections. I will explain objections such as the ‘Bad Engineer Objection’ to expose the weaknesses of the Teleological argument and prove that my thesis is indeed correct. To strengthen my credibility I will also use other objections by different philosophers.
Skepticism makes a person questions ideas toward multiple things such as knowledge or opinions that are stated as if it is true like facts. Rene Descartes argument for skepticism is to not believe every doubt that you give yourself. In his words "withstand all doubt because the evidence of our senses sometimes misleads us, it does not provide a secure basis for knowledge. We cannot be certain that we are awake and not dreaming." His argument can be argued because people have senses that can guide them to doubt themselves by the way people talk to them or other people actions.
There are strengths and weaknesses in both models. I felt both had a weakness in that they assume there is a basic assumption that is wrong in order to create a problem and did not leave room for biological factors. In Crabb’s model it all starts with a “need” that has to be filled. To me, this is a weakness because it does not allow for medical disorders. In making sure that the secular psychology principles align with biblical thinking the biological issues seem to be forgotten.
Personally, the lesson that caught my attention was the ninth lesson, “In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.” I strongly disagree with this statement because the ideas of good can be subjective. For that reason, I believe that before engaging on evil ideas it is first necessary to examine the following factors; people have misunderstandings, they are bias and can make mistakes. In all these are factoring issues could be reduced engaging in “evil” if they were considered in this lesson. From my understanding of war it occurs due to a conflict between two groups or parties. Often these problems happen because of misunderstanding that were failed to be discussed and explored.
Holton, on the other hand, argues that the traditional akratic account is flawed. Instead, he argues that an agent displays weakness of will when the agent unreasonably revises a resolution to do some action (Holton, 2009, p. 78).He also states that a person is only weak-willed if they revise their intentions when they were not supposed to revise them. This is what Holton calls
In defense of Kant, I would start by pointing out that the formula of universal law is only the first one of the formulations he gives of the categorical imperative. It would be unfair to judge the whole of Kant’s moral theory by the incompleteness of the formula of universal law. As I understand it, Kant continued with the other formulations at least partly because because he recognized that the formula of universal law seemed incomplete as the sole categorical imperative. One problem with the formula of universal law seems to be that it can generate a contradiction (and so be a morally impermissible action to take) for something which actually isn’t a moral concern. This is an issue that has been raised by others, but now I’ll formulate a more personal example to illustrate this problem.
There is definite value in her argument, but because she just scratches the surface of how emotions could be incorporated into the process of acquiring knowledge, there are a few areas of her theory that are problematic. For the sake of brevity, this paper will discuss what is, perhaps, the biggest flaw in the Jaggar reading—standpoint theories seem to be oblivious to differing experiences of particular individuals within groups and instead speaks of experiences of these groups as shared ones. Allison Jaggar asserts that theories that make the distinction between emotion and reason in association with acquiring knowledge are mistaken because they falsely assume that emotions are involuntary responses that can be separated from
Such thinkers have to allow that what people actually love, and what they would love if they were moral or prudent, may be different. In this category I would place Plato and Freud. Both hold that we can be mistaken in our love objects, and experience great frustration and despair because of such mistakes. Another distinction must be made. There are thinkers who would insist that, though we may actually love an object that is not worthy of love, we could not ____________________ Reprinted from The Symposium of Plato, Suzy Q Groden, tr., John A. Brentlinger, ed.