Red Owl appealed Issues: 1) Does promissory estoppel require that, aside from the lack of consideration, the promise sued upon must be able to sustain a cause of action under a breach of contract? 2) Once promissory estoppel is applied, to what remedy is the plaintiff entitled? Holdings: No. Promissory estoppel does not require that the promise sued upon, aside from the lack of consideration, must be able to sustain a cause of action under a breach of contract. 2) Once promissory estoppel is applied damages should be those designed to prevent injustice, not to enforce the promises made.
Adequacy of Consideration Adequacy of consideration refers to the fairness of the bargain. Ordinarily, courts will not evaluate the adequacy of consideration, unless it is so grossly inadequate as to “shock the conscience” of the court—if, in terms of its amount or worth, it indicates fraud, duress, or undue influence. The con¬tract may be declared unconscionable. A BAD BARGAIN is not failure of consideration Court do not consider the adequacy of the consideration given for the promise – the fact that the consideration supplied by one party is slight when compared with the burden undertaken by the other is immaterial as long as 1. the parties freely agreed to the exchange III. Agreements That Lack Consideration A. PREEXISTING DUTY Under most circumstances, a promise to do what one already has a legal duty to do is not legally suffi¬cient consideration.
To determine if a court might grant specific performance as a remedy for a breach of contract, it must first be determined what constitutes specific performance and the elements that accompany it. “The equitable remedy of specific performance calls for the performance of the act promised in the contract” (Miller & Jentz, 2010, Pg. 246). This remedy will usually “not be granted unless the party’s legal remedy (monetary damages) is inadequate” (Miller & Jentz, 2010, Pg. 246).
The court papers said “Plaintiffs were led to believe and had a right to believe by their agreement that Theron would not promote any jewelry or watches”. Wearing a watch of the competitor is a material breach of contract and this is called a material breach because it will enable Reimond Weil to collect damages because of the breach. Charlize Theron can claim the defense of a unilateral mistake, the defense can claim that Theron did not know that Reimond Weil were to be worn at all occasions. The defense can be weak and even if they stand, it would make the contract void between Charlize Theron and Reimond Weil and Charlize Theron would have to return the “substantial funds” that were paid out back to Reimond Weil. I would think that Reimond Weil cannot force a specific
In these circumstances Maria would not have to pay anything. the man could sue Maria for unjust enrichment. Maria would have to pay whatever a court finds to be "fair." the man could sue Maria for breach of an implied, unilateral contract. Get uop law 421 final exam answers 4.The power of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause.
(1) Prejudicial exemption and public information－J.P. Morgan concerns that the ED doesn’t make clear exemption from disclosing information that may do harm to companies. (2) Attorney-client privilege－J.P. Morgan thinks that the existing disclosing requirement of claim amounts is generally appropriate. Too much additional information of claim amounts would allow the opposing parties to use this information and waive attorney-client privileges.
4. To cancel a contract on the basis of a mistake, the mistake must be about a material fact. 5. If a price quotation contains a mistake in the adding of a number of figures, the contract may not be enforceable. 6.
In one decision, the Court held that regulations that deprive a person of all ability to develop or utilize his or her property for any economic purposes goes too far and requires just compensation. Another line of Supreme Court cases establishes that if the government effects a permanent physical invasion of the person's property, for example by requiring the owner to allow public access to the property, this constitutes a taking. Absent one of these two circumstances, however, the Court has said that the question whether a regulation goes too far is a contextual, ad hoc determination that involves the weighing of a number of factors. Foremost among these factors is the magnitude of the regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests. A particularly important issue that has been raised is whether a person who acquires property after the institution of the regulatory regime should have any claim whatsoever.
One, promises may act as consideration for some other but there are limitations, in that the value needs to be defined explicitly. Two, past consideration; if something happened in the past that did not establish some quasi-contract is cannot be currently exchanged for a promise. Consideration requires a current exchange. Third, some courts hold that relief from some moral obligation by the promisor is sufficient consideration and currently being exchanged. Fourth, the preexisting duty rule exerts that an action sufficient for reward will be not enforced if the action is already the duty of person performing the
In this case the court ruled that changing an employee’s work hours does not constitute constructive discharge under Title VII. In this case we have to determine if the employee ever asked us for a schedule accommodation. The opinion of the court may differ from this case if our employee had brought this concern to our attention and we did not offer an accommodation. Looking further into Title VII an employer may be guilty of discriminating against religious beliefs or practices unless a reasonable accommodation could be reached without undue hardship on our business. If the employee were to pursue a prima facie case they would have to prove three things to win in court: they have a bona fide religious belief that is in conflict