Nielsen states ”I shall argue…that autonomy cannot be widespread or secure in a society which is not egalitarian: where, that is, equality is not also a fundamental value which has an operative role within the society” (Munson 708). This is to mean, as reconstructed above, that for a society to be autonomous (in that its citizens are “capable of self-direction” (708)) it must also be egalitarian. The first premise of Nielsen’s argument relies on the idea of “moral equality,” which is to mean, as Nielsen says, “the life of everyone matters and matters equally“ (708). From this definition, I propose that the first premise is a self-evident claim. Nielsen later states, “Liberty cannot flourish without something approaching this equality of condition, and people without autonomous lives will surely live impoverished lives….In fine, a commitment to achieving equality of condition, far from undermining liberty
By his own admission, Fallon credits positive parental involvement for shaping his character therefore inhibiting further development of the “unconscious forces” of heredity from manifesting. The debate on free will and moral responsibility is one that seems to have no singular answer. Research by neuroscientists like James Fallon may finally render a definitive answer to this question or further fuel the flame. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty discusses the limits of governmental interference in the lives of individuals. Mill wrote what is known as the Harm Principle: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, pg
Patriotism and nationalism give a sense of identity and belonging and helps maintain authority and social order. It prevents social conflict by binding irrational dependent individuals together with a shared set of values, whist transcending the natural rights of the individuals. Lastly conservative nationalism is very defensive in the belief in a special nationality which is being eroded by another. This is different to Liberal nationalism because Liberals believe that nation states can live together without the other being compromised. This is highlighted with UKIP arguing that the EU erodes our principle of independence which links back to the idea of
He acknowledged the effect one’s cultural framework has on the viewing of different cultures, asking “what advantages our ‘good society’ possesses over that of ‘savages’” (Crandall 13). Through this lens, Papua New Guinean peoples would be viewed as a distinct culture, not, as Diamond sees them, as an early stop on an evolutionary line. If, as Boaz proposes, “human culture is not dependent on any independent variables,
Epictetus offers his famous distinction between things that do not depend on us (ie our body, fame, power …) and things that depend on us (our judgments about things, our desires, our dislikes …). To be free is to focus on the things that depend on us, and do not give importance to those that do not depend on us. Indeed, they do not depend on our own will, but the chance of external circumstances, for example, fame to which we aspire does not depend entirely on our talent, but also those who will come and bother discover this talent. In this type of action, we do not have total power, we are not only active cause and determining the success of our action. As a result, we are exposed to setbacks or disappointments that will make us unhappy.
Thus this essay will posit that Machiavelli is not motivated by immorality but rather pragmatism, in his advocacy of the means necessary to achieving an ‘end’ of stability and security for the collective good of the people. As Ramsay (1995: 179) considers, ‘we may have to be cruel to be kind’. Although the means may sometimes present an inhumane stratagem, only those which are necessary for safeguarding the state are employed, a state in which human themselves act in immoral ways. In this realist context, it is unfair to label Machiavelli an immoralist. The Elizabethan and dramatist view of Machiavelli, at least as a political thinker, is that of a man inspired by the Devil to lead good men to their doom (Berlin, 1979).
In my opinion, the historical inaccuracies were merely just story fillers and situational circumstances of the time period in which the film was made. The historical events that were changed slightly, or not added, were so miniscule that it does not take away from the reasoning behind defending the Alamo. Whether some people choose to believe it was because they wanted to fight for freedom, or to make a name for themselves, either way it doesn’t change the fact that it still is an important part of the development in the early settlement of the United States of
McCarthy uses religous rhetoric in Bells descriptions of Chigure. By calling him a ‘prohphet of destruction’ it is Bells way of articulating something that he can not understand. Throughout the novel we come to realise that Bell infact has no religious faith. Therefore Chigurh is not a transendent force of evil, he is human and in control of his own choices. What is really being articulated is that ‘we are living in a time of change’ modern society is a society based on the freedom to choose our actions as they are no longer ordaned by a religon.
Frere-Jones nods in this direction when he talks about "political correctness," but he reduces the issue to an "academic" critique rather than a vast shift in racial relations and, more importantly, expectations. The brands of "authenticity" that both punk and hip-hop came to demand, which tended to discourage the cross-pollination and "miscegenation" of musical forms, are in keeping with the identity politics that became dominant in the 1980s as well as the de facto resegregation of black and white communities that began in the Reagan era. This is the counternarrative to the cultural-level "social progress" that Frere-Jones rightly points out, in which explicit racism has retreated and black entertainers have come to dominate the
Second, he argues that it is only by virtue of something being sentient that it can be said to have interests at all, so this places sentience in a different category than the other criteria: "The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way" (175). That is, Singer is trying to establish that if a being is not sentient, the idea of extending moral consideration to it makes no sense. This negative argument is important, because one common criticism of Singer is that his criterion ends up excluding humans who are no longer sentient (like those in an irreversible coma); Singer is content to accept that consequence, but it is important that he show why the exclusion of some humans by his criterion is not problematic, given that he has criticized other criteria