Managerial Remuneration Essay

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Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis Aditya Parthasarathy, Krishnakumar Menon and Debashish Bhattacherjee Indian Institute of Management Calcutta January 2006 Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of executive compensation using the most recent data on firm performance, corporate governance and managerial compensation for a large sample of Indian firms. A linear regression model is used to develop explanations for total CEO compensation and the proportion of incentive pay that forms a part of the CEO’s compensation. It is found that firm size is a significant determinant of both these aspects of CEO compensation. The results also show that CEOs who are promoters of their firms earn significantly more than ordinary CEOs. Such individuals also earn a much larger component of their compensation as incentive pay. In addition, this study also quantifies the significant divergences in compensation policies that are followed at firms in the public sector when compared to private sector firms. E-mail for correspondence: debashish@iimcal.ac.in ; adityap2006@email.iimcal.ac.in; krishnakumarm2006@email.iimcal.ac.in 1. Introduction Conventional economic theory views the problem of managerial compensation and incentives from a ‘principal-agent’ framework. The division between ownership and management in modern corporations implies that the owners of the corporation, i.e., the shareholders, do not control its resources. Corporate control, which is understood as the power to control and use the resources of a corporation, is widely acknowledged as being in the hands of the managers in the organization. As a result, the standard problem related to the misalignment of owner’s and manager’s goals has to be overcome to achieve an efficient, wealth (or utility) maximizing solution. Both organizational and

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