Krispy Kreme has tampered with its financial statements ranging from 2000 to 2004 when they could not make its revenue targets to satisfy Wall Street. We found many discrepancies from the years after analyzing the income and the balance sheet statements in Exhibit 1. The balance sheet and the income statement had undergone major changes, particularly in years 2003 and 2004. While examining the balance sheet, we noticed the cash account nearly tripled from 2001 to 2004, total equity exceeded debt hence the reason for the low debt to equity ratio. The income statement’s total revenues doubled in two years due to their unusual growth.
2010) is provided below. 1167872 4 Despite the leading position and the good business results, SWOT shows several sources of potential risks for UST. The company is losing market share against new price-value competitors because of slow innovation and late product introduction and extensions. Historically, UST relied on his leading market position boosting earnings with annual prices increases. But in the meanwhile smaller competitors started to quickly erode market share with prices cut.
Average turnaround time (TAT) has grown from about three days in 1989 to more than five days in 1991 while its main competitor, Golden Gate, has achieved two-day TATs and is now promising one day. As a percent of revenues, branch profits in 1989 were 20.2%; in 1991, the branch suffered a 1.7% loss (Exhibit 1). Analysis There are five fundamental problems with the current process: 1. The relative value of new policies and renewals is not clear to the underwriting teams. While new policies are important for Fruitvale’s long-run viability, they are more risky (Exhibit 1) and require more labor to process (Exhibit 2a).
Sales and net income have grown, and although the growth in revenues has outpaced the average competitor within the industry, the net income growth has not. TARGET has very weak liquidity. Currently, the Quick Ratio is 0.45 which clearly shows a lack of ability to cover short-term cash needs. The company’s liquidity has decreased from the same period last year. During the same period, stockholders’ equity (“net worth”) has increased by 7.12% from the same quarter last year.
"We're definitely benefiting from the dollar weakness ... in two ways," Chief Executive Robert Iger told analysts on a conference call. A cheaper mix of hotel room offerings and bargains for extended stays also kept tourists coming, he said. Domestic park attendance was up 5 percent, while parks in Paris and Hong Kong saw double-digit increases. "While we don't know where the marketplace will take us, we believe we're much better positioned in a difficult economic cycle than we were in the past, certainly back in 1991," Iger said. Analysts had expected that the weak U.S. economy and reduced consumer spending might impede revenue at Disney theme parks.
The industry had experienced unprecedented growth in the prior decade, with growth rates of 18% as well as skyrocketing earnings, due, largely in part to the 70% - 85% average gross margins on products. By 1991, the industry once considered to be the most profitable and the fastest growing in the country was beginning to slow down. Diminished pricing flexibility, lethargic innovation, increased competition within drug classes, and the threat of generic substitutes were highlighted as the cause of this decline. It is ironic that the period of slow innovation, beginning in the late 1980’s was also marked by notable increases in R&D investment. This contradiction was caused by the introduction of new regulatory requirements, increased complexity of new compounds, and escalating development costs.
Further it increased both sales and net income by 54% and 28% vs. 1993, but the company has a problem of a liquidity and a shortage of cash. One of the biggest indicators of this problem is almost double decrease in quick ratio in 2 years (Exhibit 1). This means that the company has a decrement of current assets (not considering inventory) comparing to current liabilities by 0.66. Another factor which helps us understand the reason for shortage is Cash Cycle, which consists of Average Collection days and Average Inventory days subtracted by Average Payment days. This indicator is increasing dramatically by almost 11 days in two years, because of increase of Collection and Inventory days by 16 and minor increase of Payables days by 5 (Exhibit 2 and 3).
Operating income moved along the same path for the period albeit at a lower rate. The company’s invest ment in its self-insurance fund and interest income contributed significantly to the difference between operating income and net income. Revenue fell off by 12% in 2009 however; it increased by 22% in 2010. The company was able to increase it domestic and commercial rate after an application was made to the Fair Trading Commission. Fuel expenses grew at a faster rate than sales, fuel costs although seeing a fall off in 2009 by 20.52% rose by 29% in 2010.
iii)There is very little increase in SG&A as not much was spend in terms of sales effort. iv)AR increased significantly with some of the promissory notes are payable in June 1994 (6 months after sale) v)Probably increase marketing, promotional and expenses related to discounts in the subsequent year due to “Premier Vision” plan. This impact is significant. From the statements, B&L reported a 13% YoY increase in sales revenue. However, exhibit 6 showed that there was a decline in market demand for conventional lenses, but an increase in both planned replacement and disposal lenses.
Centralia store’s sales have been below budget for the last quarter of 2002 and this first quarter of 2003. Still, operating margins are near plan due to sales of slightly higher gross margin items and a reduction in operating expenses. They have also had a higher customer count for this first quarter (Kerin & Peterson, 1998/2010, pp. 484-495). Market Conditions Centralia, Missouri had food and beverage sales of $62.3 million in 2002, which was a 4.6 percent increase over the previous year.