Factors for consideration a. law’s non-logical implications in interpretation what parties would’ve agreed to (ex. Haines: duration and scope of contract) - policy: at-will doctrine in employment: policy - would’ve agreed to terms had they anticipated situation - had in mind, but didn’t express it b. context - what is the objective of the contract? Is it ambiguous? Ex. Spaulding v. Morse (369): stop yearly payment to trust during time in armed services - enforce according to terms if unambiguous, consider context if terms are ambiguous - not only context at time of contract formation, but also what happened AFTER ⇨ changed circumstances - why look at context?
It becomes a change in motion as opposed to its own type of motion. Therefore, nature no longer determines motion, motion determines nature in a sense. This leads to Heidegger’s seventh implication, that nature no longer determines motion, but it is “the manner in which they are present in space and time.” Heidegger follows by saying, “We cannot set forth here the full implications of the revolution of inquiry into nature.” I will attempt to define at least one implication of this change in the view of this subject. When considering the ancient theory of motion with the modern in regard to the concept of man, the debate of nature versus nurture comes to mind. Though Aristotle does refer to
Compare and contrast our approach to knowledge about the past with our approach to knowledge about the future To compare our approach to knowledge about the past with our approach to knowledge about the future, it first must be determined what ‘knowledge’ is. According to Plato knowledge is “a justified true belief”. So, knowledge must have a logical evidence and to be approved by society and facts. However, to define ‘knowledge’ is not as easy as it seems. The following quote from Bertrand Russell demonstrates it: "The question how knowledge should be defined is perhaps the most important and difficult one with which we shall deal.
141) 2) A. The essential element of causation is that A “produces” B or A “forces” B to occur. Empirically, we can never demonstrate A-B causality with certainty. The reason is that we do not “demonstrate” such causal linkages deductively. Unlike deductive conclusions, empirical conclusions are inferences— inductive conclusions.
It can be characterized by self-consciousness and reflexiveness. This is very closely related to Postmodernism (Sarup 1993). POSTMODERNISM “There is a sense in which if one sees modernism as the culture of modernity, postmodernism is the culture of postmodernity” (Sarup 1993). “Modern, overloaded individuals, desperately trying to maintain rootedness and integrity ... ultimately are pushed to the point where there is little reason not to believe that all value-orientations are equally well-founded. Therefore, increasingly, choice becomes meaningless.
In Hancock & Shankland, their Lordships stressed “that moral certainty or overwhelming probability was necessary in order to constitute intention.” Indeed, The Maloney direction was criticised as it did not provide any reference to probability. The lack of uniformity of the meaning of intention in the above cases was addressed in Nedrick by Lord Lane CJ when he provided what is considered to be a ‘model direction’ to the meaning of oblique
As Fredric Jameson defined this difference: the historicizing operation can follow two distinct paths, which only ultimately meet in the same place: the path of the object and the path of the subject, the historical origins of the things themselves and that more intangible historicity of the concepts and categories by which we attempt to understand those things.1 The paucity of the available evidence means that the paths identified by Jameson will never meet: conclusions will remain hypothetical, judgments controversial. This does not mean that the enquiry is entirely quixotic or simply arbitrary. It can take its place in the realm of the provisional and the relatively persuasive which is the familiar home of literature, theory and politics. It is obliged to live with an old anxiety about authentic knowledge and preserve a decent reticence about imposing on the past anachronistic values of the present. Such concerns are especially potent when one is negotiating the ancient classics, a field which until recently was the preserve of a special clerisy.
The Heckscher-Ohlin concept of comparative advantage was created as an alternative to the Ricardian model and had a logical undertaking: the exclusion of the labor theory of import and also the integration of the classical price mechanism into international trade theory. The experiential legitimacy of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and argues that the majority of the realistic work aimed toward proving the legitimacy of the model by specializing in its power to forecast trade patterns is inapplicable. Moreover, the dynamic version of the model, that predicts dynamic structural amendment within the long-standing time, is predicated on straightforward observation. Secondly, it exposes the theoretical faults of the model by questioning its treatment of capital and labor. Finally, it contests the view that the model surpasses the Ricardian model in its ability to predict patterns of trade between low- and high-income countries by demonstrating that the Ricardian model would additionally forestall similar trade patterns.
For a world state would be something to be feared.2 On Modernity – “at the end of the 18th century, there was the experience of living in a society and a time in which all pregiven models and norms were disintegrating, and in which one therefore had to discover one's own. Seen in this way, modernity is primarily a challenge. In positive term, tis epoch is essentially characterised by the notion of individual freedom, and this in three respects: as scientific freedom, as freedom of self-determination-no norm is to be recognised whose point one cannot see for onself- and as freedom of self-realisation. I am not just an apologist for modernity. I am fully aware of its ambivalences, its dark sides; above all, the peculiar feature of modern societies – and this is a structural property – that they continually endanger themselves in the course of the development of their potentials.
The Hermeneutic Conception of Culture Heidegger, the founder of the hermeneutic paradigm, rejected the traditional account of cultural activity as a search for universally valid foundations for human action and knowledge. His main work, Sein und Zeit (1927), develops a holistic epistemology according to which all meaning is context-dependent and permanently anticipated from a particular horizon, perspective or background of intelligibility. The result is a powerful critique directed against the ideal of objectivity. Gadamer shares with Heidegger the hermeneutic reflections developed in Sein und Zeit and the critique of objectivity, describing the cultural activity as an endless process of "fusions of horizons." On the one hand, this is an echo of the Heideggerian holism, namely, of the thesis that all meaning depends on a particular interpretative context.