Blaise Pascal: Mechanist and Fideist

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In the seventeenth century, European intellectuals developed a new understanding of scientific endeavor, namely to discern natural causes through quantitative measurement. Galileo first challenged the Scholastic supposition that mathematical astronomy was merely ancillary to natural philosophy, and by the middle of the century, both the Cartesian and Newtonian mechanical systems had placed mathematics at center stage, disdaining qualitative physics as irrelevant, unknowable, and misleading. Consistent with their methodology, the mechanists tended to reduce the ontological reality of the natural world to its quantitative aspects, implicitly or explicitly eliminating all categories other than extension, time, space, and motion. In this interpretation, Descartes’ treatment of matter as extension merely formalized an intellectual aesthetic that even his adversaries held in practice. We can easily see this penchant for quantification in Newton’s belief that all physics is mechanical, but we might not expect to find a mania for quantity among those who held a more poetic view of reality. Such an enigma is precisely what we discover in Blaise Pascal, a man who intensely contemplated the ineffable qualitative aspects of human and divine reality, yet remained as thoroughly mechanistic in his treatment of the natural world as Descartes himself. By exploring this dual reality of Pascal’s intellectual life, we can examine how his brand of fideism synthesized the enchanted world of his Catholic faith with a seemingly disenchanted, corpuscular, quantitative science. During his privileged youth, Pascal enjoyed the advantages of a critical scientific education and the company of the greatest French luminaries, including Descartes, Fermat, Roberval, Mersenne, and Gassendi. By the time he published his Essai pour les coniques (1640) at the age of sixteen, Pascal
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